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Summary
Before the September 11th terrorist attacks, experts questioned whether the
government was prepared adequately to conduct and use research and development
(R&D) to counter terrorism.  They cited inadequate planning; conflicting information
about agency funding; the absence of coordinated ways to set priorities and eliminate
duplication; and the need to use research resources effectively.  Mechanisms have
been established since then to set specific R&D priorities and to coordinate
interagency policy.  The Office of Homeland Security (OHS), created by Executive
Order 13228, does not list R&D among its major responsibilities, but R&D is a topic
of one of the interagency Policy Coordination Committees attached to the Homeland
Security Council (HSC), OHS’s interagency group.  The director of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) was not named to participate in OHS
activities, but an OSTP staff member is filling the HSC interagency R&D policy
coordination role.  The President gave OSTP responsibilities for policies regarding
foreign student visas, foreign enrollment in “sensitive” courses, and technology for
immigration.  The National Science and Technology Council, an interagency body,
staffed by OSTP, has five antiterrorism R&D working groups.  
Proposals have been made to expand the interagency Technical Support
Working Group and the Defense Department’s Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, which have funded counterterrorism R&D in the past.  The House passed
H.R. 5005, an amended version of legislation that the President sent to Congress to
create a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) which would plan, fund, and
coordinate some R&D.  S. 2452, the Lieberman substitute agreed to by the
Governmental Affairs Committee, would give broader R&D authority to a national
homeland security department.  Each proposal would create different kinds of units
to analyze and evaluate counterterrorism technologies before procurement and
deployment and to coordinate some federal counterterrorism R&D.  The President’s
FY2003 counterterrorism R&D budget request was $3 billion; the DHS envisioned
in H.R. 5005 would handle about 17% of this, comprised of about $300 million of
newly authorized R&D and between $200 to $300 million of already authorized
R&D to be transferred to the proposed department.
Bioterrorism R&D funding is managed largely by the Defense and Health and
Human Services departments.  Each agency has intra-agency coordination
mechanisms, and formal interagency groups have been established.  The interagency
President’s Critical Infrastructure Board has responsibility for information security
R&D; OSTP was tasked to help it coordinate R&D priorities and the board was
authorized to request federal agencies to fund priority R&D programs.  
Among the issues to be considered in creating a new homeland security
department with R&D responsibilities are: which R&D areas should be transferred;
can other related R&D be coordinated effectively and without erecting barriers
between the conduct of civilian and security-related R&D; and how should the
existing counterterrorism R&D coordination mechanisms in OSTP, OHS and other
departments be linked to a homeland security department with R&D responsibilities?
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Federal Research and Development 
Organization, Policy, and Funding for
Counterterrorism
Introduction
Since the September 11th terrorist attacks, federal activities and organization for
counterterrorism research and development (R&D) have evolved.  This report
inventories federal agency counterterrorism R&D funding patterns, programs, and
priority-setting and coordination mechanisms, and assesses changes proposed.  The
report describes developments in federal organization to set priorities and coordinate
R&D in the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the Office of
Homeland Security (OHS), and related bodies.  It also describes how R&D would be
managed and coordinated in the major legislative proposals to create a homeland
security department, and assesses these arrangements.  Issues arising from legislative
proposals to centralize R&D in a homeland security department include: identifying
which R&D areas should be transferred to a department; deciding whether other
related R&D can be coordinated effectively and without erecting barriers between the
conduct of civilian and security-related R&D; and determining if and how the
existing counterterrorism R&D coordination mechanisms in OSTP, OHS and other
departments should be linked to a homeland security department with R&D
responsibilities.  The topics of bioterrorism R&D and information security R&D are
covered as case studies in the appendix because they received considerable attention
both before and after the September 11 attacks and they illustrate different kinds of
coordination mechanisms that have been established.
CRS Report RL31202, Federal Research and Development for
Counterterrorism: Organization, Funding, and Options, covered counterterrorism
R&D priority-setting and coordination activities through December 2001.  Also, it
summarized the recommendations for improvement made in authoritative reports.
This document updates parts of that report, but does not repeat the expert
recommendations made before December 2001.  It also excludes discussion of bills
introduced which do not appear to be active.  CRS Report RL31354, Possible
Impacts of Major Counterterrorism Security Actions on Research, Development, and
Higher Education, deals with related issues .
A list of acronyms used in this report appears in the appendix.
CRS-2
1OMB, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, FY2002, June 2002,
authorized by Congress in Section 1051 of the FY1998 National Defense Authorization Act,
P.L. 105-85 (which required information on executive branch funding to combat terrorism)
and section 1403 of P.L. 105-26 (which required information on domestic preparedness),
p. 15.  See also: President George W. Bush, Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the
Nation, 2002.
2The website is [http://www.ostp.gov/html/AntiTerrorismS&T.pdf].
3OMB, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, FY2002, pp. 17-18.
4OMB, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, FY2002, p. 27. 
Federal Agency Funding and Programs for
Counterterrorism R&D
The Office of Management and Budget’s  Annual Report to Congress on
Combating Terrorism, FY2002 reported that $44.802 billion was requested for
combating terrorism (both defensive and offensive measures for homeland security,
overseas budget, and against conventional weapons and weapons of mass
destruction) for FY2003.1  Of this, about $2.905 billion – or 5.5% of the total – was
requested for federal R&D to develop technologies to deter, prevent or mitigate
terrorist acts.  This is an increase from FY2002, when appropriated funds, combined
with the Emergency Response Fund, totaled $36.468 billion, with R&D funding at
$1.162 billion, or 3.2% of the total.  The budget request for FY2003 counterterrorism
R&D is about double the amount appropriated for FY2002; funding for FY2002 was
about triple the amount allocated in FY2001.  The three largest funding increases for
FY2003 were for the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the National Science Foundation
(NSF).  See Table 1.  OSTP has identified some examples of the Administration’s
science and technology-related antiterrorism priorities for FY2003.2
As shown in Table 1, the Department of Health and Human Service (DHHS),
with 57% of the total, would be the largest supporter of federal counterterrorism
R&D, reflecting the Administration’s emphasis on bioterrorism.  In previous years,
the largest recipient of such funding was the national security community.  DHHS
would receive an increase of $1.65 billion, for a total of about $1.77 billion requested
in FY2003 for “NIH to research vaccines and other medicines for protection against
bioterrorism.”3  
Funding for counterterrorism R&D by the national security community at 25%
of the total requested for FY2003, would go largely to the Defense Advanced
Projects Agency (DARPA) in the Department of Defense (DOD), for war fighting
applications as well as for bioterrorism.4  The request included $420 million for
DOD’s Biological Counterterrorism Research Program, which would establish a
Center for Biological Counterterrorism at the U.S. Army Medical Research and
Materiel Command Fort Detrick, Maryland, and the Biological Defense Homeland
Security Support Program, which would “initiate demonstration of technologies in
CRS-3
5OMB, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, FY2002, p. 27.
6OMB, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, FY2002, p. 28. 
two urban areas for the timely detection of bioterror events.”5  Other national
security-related R&D would be for protection, contamination avoidance (including
detection), and decontamination.  The national security line also included $49 million
for the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) – a State Department/DOD
“interagency forum that identifies, prioritizes, and coordinates interagency and 
Table 1. Research and Development Funding to Combat
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7.0 7.0 0 27.0
National Security 190.0 298.9 385.5 11.0 767.2
Transportation 50.7 50.2 58.3 64.0 59.3
Treasury 2.1 1.2 1.1 0 1.1
Total $511.3 $589.4 $795.2 $366.8 $2,905.23
Source: OMB, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, FY2001, p. 27 for column
labeled FY2000.  The rest of the data is from: OMB, Annual Report to Congress on Combating
Terrorism, June 24, 2002, p. 26.
international R&D requirements for combating terrorism” and conducts R&D
specifically to develop new technologies and equipment for counterterrorism.  In
recent years, about 20 to 25% of TSWG’s funding has come from other agencies.6
(TSWG’s functions are discussed in more detail below in the sections entitled
“Current Organization for Counterterrorism R&D” and “Creative R&D Funding
Mechanisms.”)  
(Some of the data presented by OMB appears to conflict internally and also with
agency-generated information.  For example, the OMB Annual Report to Congress on
Combating Terrorism, FY2002 reported that the DOD counterterrorism R&D budget
CRS-4
7Dale S. Klein, “Biological Terrorism: Department of Defense Research and Development,”
Testimony before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, at a hearing on Technology for Combating Terrorism and Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD), Apr. 10, 2002, p. 2.
8OMB, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, FY2001, p. 36.
9Kerry Boyd, “National Laboratories Accelerate Counterterrorism Efforts,” GovExec.com,
Apr. 22, 2002.
10OMB,  Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, FY2002, p. 28.
request for FY2003 would be $835 million (p. 66); whereas the total “national
security” R&D budget request which includes DOD, reports the DOD budget request
at $767.2 million (p. 26).  As another example, DOD’s Chemical and Biological
Defense Program request for FY2003, according to congressional testimony, totaled
$1.329 billion, of which $933 million would go to research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E).  This is about $300 million more than in the President’s budget
request.  Of this amount reported by DOD, $576 million was for S&T base and $436
million for procurement.7  For additional details see below in Appendix 2, in the
section on “FY2003 Bioterrorism R&D Priorities.”)
The Environmental Protection Agency’s budget for counterterrorism R&D was
to be increased by $72.2 million in FY2003 for research for better techniques for
cleaning up buildings contaminated by biological agents and for work on the effects
of World Trade Center dust contaminants on human health.  
The Department of Energy’s (DOE) counterterrorism R&D has ranged across
such areas as genomic sequencing, development of new DNA-based diagnostics,
advanced modeling and simulation, and microfabrication technologies.  DOE “is
developing models for evaluating effectiveness of response and mitigation measures,
such as reducing vulnerability of installations and improving operations and
procedures at key urban facilities (e.g. evacuation, sheltering, traffic control, train
control in subways, control of air handling systems).”8  DOE also supports
counterterrorism R&D at federal laboratories, R&D to improve the security of federal
laboratories, and systems R&D totaling $20 million for the National Infrastructure
Simulation and Analysis Center.  DOE’s laboratories’ counterterrorism budgets have
increased.  Before the September 11 attacks, Sandia and Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratories had done work relating to materials used in weapons of mass destruction,
focusing largely on nuclear weapons.  After the attacks, work accelerated on assessing
anthrax detection and treatment activities for the Postal Service and congressional
buildings, and taking atmospheric measurements to detect possible airborne toxic
agents.9  DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) R&D program
“emphasizes maintaining the technology base and conducting the applied research
needed to develop and demonstrate nuclear, chemical, and biological detection and
related technologies ....”10 
The Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Agricultural Research Service
conducts counterterrorism-related research into plant, pest, and animal diseases from
natural or inadvertent introductions.  The Department of Justice’s R&D focuses on
technologies for law enforcement efforts against terrorism.  In the Commerce
CRS-5
11OMB, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, FY2002, pp. 17-18.
12OMB, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, FY2002, p.65.
13Includes links to Research Opportunities, NIAID Bioterrorism Research Agenda, Mar. 14,
2002; National Security Education Program Institutional Grants FY2002 Counter-
Terrorism R&D; The National Science Foundation Response to Terrorist Attacks, Federal
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) Broad Agency Announcements, Mar. 2002;
Department of Defense;  National Institute of Mental Health; National Institutes of Health -
Bioterrorism Research Funding Opportunities.
Department, R&D at the National Institute of Standards and Technology. (NIST),
focuses on protecting information systems with attention to “system survivability
and cryptography ....”  
National Science Foundation counterterrorism R&D supports combating
bioterrorism in the areas of infectious diseases and microbial genome sequencing;”11
and critical infrastructure protection R&D, including $204 million requested for
basic research on encryption technologies, energy processing systems, computing
reliability, remediation robotics and modeling and simulation.  It also funds Disaster
Response Research Teams and a Cybercorp Scholarship program to support
graduate students studying information technology who plan to work for the
government (FY2003 funding requested at $11 million).12
Many agencies have posted lists of research opportunities for  counterterrorism
R&D.  Centralized access to these is available from a National Association of State
Universities and Land-Grant Colleges/Association of American Universities
(NASULGC) website at [http://www.aau.edu/resources/research.html].13
Administration Priorities and Strategy for
Homeland Security-related R&D
The Administration has taken steps to develop priorities for counterterrorism
R&D.  This is reflected in budget priority documents, strategy documents released
by the Office of Homeland Security (OHS), and activities undertaken by
Antiterrorism Task Force Working Groups, which are part of the National Science
and Technology Council (NSTC).  
OSTP and OMB have identified the Administration’s FY2004 budget priorities
for “Homeland Security and Antiterrorism R&D” as follows:
... [E]nhancing our capabilities for (a) early detection of catastrophic terrorist
threats and any subsequent exposures, (b) rapid response to them and mitigation
of their effects, and (c) physical decontamination techniques and prophylactic
and treatment measures.  Research should be focused on areas with the potential
to dramatically enhance our capabilities for detecting the presence of, and
responding to, nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological, and conventional
explosive threats in air, sea, rail, and road transport, both beyond and within our
borders.  Other priority areas include advances in information technology for
examining large and disparate databases to identify any anomalies that might
indicate terrorist intent on the part of individuals or groups of individuals, and
CRS-6
14Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, From John H.
Marburger, III, Director, OSTP and Mitchell Daniels, Director, OMB, FY 2004 Interagency
R e s e a r c h  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t  P r i o r i t i e s ,  M a y  3 0 ,  2 0 0 2
[http://www.ostp.gov/html/ombguidmemo.pdf]. 
15Office of Homeland Security, (EOP),  National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002,
p. 52-54
16Pat Phibbs, “Strategic Plan on Homeland Security To Emerge In Summer, EPA Official
Says,” Daily Report for Executives, May 16, 2002, p A-6. 
17Neil Munro, “Bioterrorism Preparedness Plan Expected This Summer,” GovExec.com,
May 3, 2002. 
the development of better biometric techniques, applied at the phenotype or
genotype levels, for verifying or determining terrorist identity.  Additionally,
this effort should identify and apply relevant computer and network security
research, including research developed under NITRD [Networking and
Information Technology R&D, another interagency R&D priority].  ... Agency
budget requests in these areas should factor in recommendations of the
President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Standing Committee for Research
and Development.14
In addition to these budget emphases, in July 2002, OHS released a
comprehensive National Strategy for Homeland Security that identified goals for
many areas, including science and technology.  See Table 2.
Table 2.  Summary of the Major Science and Technology
Initiatives in the OHS Document, National Strategy for
Homeland Security
! Develop chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures
! Develop systems for detecting hostile intent
! Apply biometric technology to identification devices
! Improve the technical capabilities of first responders
! Establish a mechanism for rapidly producing prototypes
! Conduct demonstrations and pilot deployments
! Set standards for homeland security technology
! Establish a system for high-risk, high-payoff homeland security research.15
It has also been reported that separate agencies will prepare strategic plans to
address homeland security issues.  For instance, reportedly, the EPA plan will
include a review of the capacity of its laboratories to transport and detect samples
of toxic agents.16  The Administration plans to announce  a “comprehensive plan for
defending the nation against biological warfare,” according to Anna Johnson-
Winegar, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for chemical and biological
defense.  Among the R&D topics to be considered is the creation a national vaccine
strategy and office to oversee the development of vaccines to fight diseases.17  In
addition, as noted below, the five NSTC Antiterrorism working groups are preparing
lists of priorities for counter terrorism R&D that will be used in developing detailed
FY2004 budget requests.  (See Appendix 1.) 
CRS-7
18See the summary of information about these reports in CRS Report RL31202, Federal
Research and Development for Counter Terrorism: Organization, Funding, and Options,
January 3, 2002, throughout and especially pp. 8-10. 
19On October 23, 2001, the TSWG issued a broad agency announcement (BAA) request –
a special method DOD uses to place a contract to procure information or adapt existing
technology rapidly and with less red tape than is typical. (Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and Combating Terrorism Technology Support
Office, Technical Support Working Group, Broad Agency Announcement BAA 02-Q-4655,
Oct. 23, 2001, p. 16.)  DOD was seeking information to develop 38 specific
counterterrorism technologies for military, intelligence, and security operations that could
be deployed within the rapid time frame of 12 to 18 months.  (See Greg Schneider and
Robert O’Hare,”Pentagon Makes Rush Order for Anti-Terror Technology,” Washington
Post, Oct. 26, 2001, p. A10.)  Among the technologies and systems DOD sought were an
automated system to use voice prints to locate and track terrorist suspects; a speaker
recognition system to identify Middle Eastern and Central/South Asian languages in speech;
a battery-powered device to analyze liquid samples for the presence of biological warfare
agents; and walkthrough portals for nonstationary personnel screening (BAA 02-Q-4655,
(continued...)
Current Organization for Interagency Coordination
of Counterterrorism R&D 
Proposals to improve coordination of counterterrorism R&D received
considerable attention from expert commissions and groups before the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001.18  These groups noted that such R&D often was
underfunded, not well-prioritized or developed within programs for short-term and
longer-term fundamental research.  Often R&D was fragmented across many
departments or was wastefully duplicated, not clearly related to security
requirements as defined by intelligence agencies, and poorly positioned to ensure
rapid transitioning into technology, testing, and procurement.  These groups
recommended that linkages with the academic and industrial sectors be strengthened
to take advantage of leading-edge work.  Before the September 2001 attacks, the
most prominent coordination groups for counterterrorism R&D were the Technical
Support Working Group, the National Security Council, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, and the National Science and Technology Council.  Since then
counterterrorism R&D functions in these units have been augmented and the Office
of Homeland Security was created and tasked with some R&D coordination
functions. 
Discussed next are organizational arrangements for counterterrorism R&D,
exclusive of those in OSTP.  These are summarized in Table 3.
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)  
Before September 11, 2001, the most visible part of the federal apparatus for
coordinating the planning and conduct of interagency counterterrorism R&D was
the Technical Support Working group (TSWG), which operates under the policy
guidance of the Department of State-chaired Interagency Group on Terrorism.  Its
activities have been intensified since the attacks.19  TSWG identifies, prioritizes, and
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pp. 17-23).  This announcement generated more than 12,000 proposals which could possibly
result in awards during FY2002 totaling $20 million to $40 million. (“Industry Submits
12,000 Proposals to Help in U.S. Fight Against Terrorism,”Daily Report for Executives, Jan.
15, 2002, A-1.)  The TSWG issued two additional BAAs on March 4, 2002, (DAAD 05-02-
T-0215) which focused on “Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
Countermeasures,” and “Investigative Support and Forensics.”  Announcements issued in
July 2002 solicited proposals for technologies dealing with “Explosives Detection,”
“Improved Device Defeat,” “Infrastructure Protection,” “Personnel Protection,” “Physical
Security,” and “Tactical Operations Support.”  (BAA 02-Q-4702 and 02-Q-4738, issued on
J u l y  2 2 ,  2 0 0 2 .   B A A s  a r e  a c c e s s i b l e  f r o m
https://www.bids.tswg.gov/tswg/bids.nsf/Main?OpenFrameset&589 PCV.)
20Letter from Robin Cleveland, National Security Programs, OMB, to Stephen Caldwell,
GAO, Sept. 4, 2001, in GAO, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related
Recommendations, Sept. 2001 (GAO-01-822), p. 163. 
21GAO, Combating Terrorism, September 2001, p. 82.  
22GAO, Combating Terrorism, September 2001, p. 82.
coordinates interagency and international R&D for combating terrorism.  It is mostly
“ ... focused on near-term, requirements-driven, non-medical R&D with a focus on
deployable technologies that will serve the needs of first responders.”20  It provides
Table 3.  Summary of Interagency Coordination for
Counterterrorism R&D, Other Bodies, Including Office of
Homeland Security
National Security Council (NSC)
Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Group
Subgroup on R&D (chaired by OSTP; TSWG is a member)
Office of Homeland Security (OHS)
Homeland Security Council (HSC) 
Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Research and Development, led
by OSTP Assistant Director for National Security
PCC on Public Health Preparedness
Homeland Security Advisory Council
Senior Advisory Committees (includes PCAST members)
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) (Coordinates and funds R&D for               
            technologies to combat terrorism that are useful to more than one agency;        
            headed by Dept. of State and Dept. of Defense)
(Source: Prepared by CRS.)
“a way for technologies to be developed when a single agency cannot invest
sufficiently in a technology that would benefit multiple agencies ....”  TSWG
coordinated $60 million worth of R&D in FY2000.21  This constituted what GAO
called “... a minor share of all terrorism-related research and development being
conducted across the federal government ....”22  As noted above, funding for TSWG
was requested at $49 million for FY2003.  About 2/3 of TSWG’s funding is from
national security agencies and an additional 1/3 comes from some of the more than
40 other agencies that participate in its activities.  
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24Technical Support Working Group, Program Overview 2000: Technical Support Working
Group, passim, preface, and p. 37.  The TSWG subgroups deal with: chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear countermeasures; explosive detection; improvised device defeat;
infrastructure protection; investigative support and forensics; personnel protection; physical
security surveillance, collection, and operations support; and tactical operations support
[http://www.tswg.gov/tswg/home.htm].
25Letter Cleveland to Caldwell, in GAO, Combating Terrorism, p. 164.
TSWG also addresses joint international operational requirements through
cooperative R&D with the United Kingdom, Canada, and Israel, and has an outreach
program, so that state and local agencies can benefit from new technology
developments.  The group operates under the “technical oversight of the DOD
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict.  An Executive Committee chaired by the Department of State
representative provides program direction.  Members of the Executive Committee
include representatives from DOD, DOE, and the Department of Justice (FBI).”
DOD manages and executes the programs through the Combating Terrorism
Technology Support Office.23  TSWG has eight subgroups that focus on developing
technology and prototyping efforts.24  Each subgroup has many federal agency
members, for instance, the Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) group
membership numbers 15 major departments and agencies and many subunits within
agencies. 
National Security Council (NSC)  
The National Security Council (NSC) has core  responsibility to coordinate
defense and foreign policy-related counterterrorism R&D policy across the
government.  It has a Policy Coordinating Committee on Counterterrorism and
National Preparedness and a NSC-chaired Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Group (PWMD), with eight subgroups, including a Research and
Development Subgroup, which reports to the NSC chair.  The PWMD group was
chartered under National Security Presidential Decision Directive-1, dated February
2001, to address the government’s preparedness to forestall or respond to terrorist
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological
or nuclear).  “All federal departments and agencies with interests, equities, or needs
in research and development for combating terrorism are represented on the PWMD
R&D Subgroup.”25  The subgroup works to coordinate ongoing R&D activities and
to assist in the preparation and review of the President’s budget request for work on
counterterrorism R&D and it makes recommendations to the PWMD.  It is chaired
by OSTP; a TSWG co-chair is a member of the Subgroup.  While TSWG focuses
on shorter term projects only of interest to its members, the NSC subgroup focuses
on long-range projects and “... has a broad role in identifying long-range, large-scale
research and development issues that involve preventing, countering, and
responding to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorist attacks.”  The
PWMD R&D subgroup consults “with other NSC subgroup chairs to identify
comprehensive R&D needs in preparedness for combating terrorism; identifying and
prioritizing R&D gap-filling objectives; implementing a process for reporting
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26Letter Cleveland to Caldwell, in GAO Combating Terrorism, p. 165.
27“President Establishes Office of Homeland Security, Summary of the President’s
Executive Order, The Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council,”
White House Press Release, Oct. 8, 2001. 
28For instance, with respect to “detection,” it was given responsibility to coordinate activities
to ensure that agencies have sufficient technological capabilities to collect intelligence data
about terrorism, and to coordinate development of monitoring protocols and equipment for
use in detecting the release of biological, chemical, and radiological hazards.  Under the
function of “preparedness,” it was tasked to coordinate national efforts to ensure public
health preparedness, including stockpiling of vaccine and pharmaceuticals and hospital
capacity.  Under the function of “protection,” the office was to coordinate efforts to protect
critical infrastructure, including energy, telecommunications, nuclear materials,
transportation, agriculture, food and water systems, and access to, and use of, chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive or other materials.  It was also assigned, as part
of its “response and recovery” functions, coordination of containment and removal of
biological, chemical, radiological, explosive or other hazardous materials. (Executive Order
Establishing Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council, Oct. 8,
2001.)
progress toward achieving R&D objectives; and continuing the ongoing effort to
achieve concordance of R&D objectives with agency programs.”26
Office of Homeland Security (OHS)  
On October 8, 2001 the President established the Office of Homeland Security
(OHS) by Executive Order 13228, and named Governor Tom Ridge the Assistant
to the President for Homeland Security.  The OHS, located in the Executive Office
of the President, has the “mission to develop and coordinate the implementation of
a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threat
or attacks.  The Office was directed to coordinate the executive branch’s efforts to
detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist
attacks ....” 27  Also, it would advise the Director of the Budget on programs that will
contribute to the Administration’s strategy.  Although the Assistant for Homeland
Security can review the budgets of homeland security-related programs submitted
to the OMB and suggest legislation to help agencies fight terrorism, he has no
authority to modify or approve agency budgets.  The executive order creating the
Office of Homeland Security did not include either R&D priority-setting or R&D
coordination among the functions assigned to it, which included such things as
“detection,” “response and recovery,” “prevention,” and “incident management.”
However, the office was assigned activities that explicitly or implicitly involve
applications of science and technology.28
Homeland Security Council’s Policy Coordination Committee.  In
addition to creating the Office of Homeland Security, Executive Order 13228
created a Homeland Security Council, whose purpose is to advise and assist the
“President with respect to all aspects of homeland security.”  The Council is to
“serve as the mechanism for ensuring coordination of homeland security-related
activities of executive departments and agencies and effective development and
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29Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security
Council, Oct. 8, 2001. 
30“President Establishes Office of Homeland Security.”  White House Press Release, Oct.
8, 2001.
31The OSTP Director was not named a member of the Principals Committee.  The members
are the Secretaries of the Treasury, of Defense, of Health and Human Services, and of
Transportation; the Attorney General, the Director of OMB, the Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff; the Director of
Central Intelligence; the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of
FEMA; the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to the Vice President.  The
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall be invited to attend all
meetings.  The following people are to be invited to the committee meetings when issues
pertaining to their responsibilities and expertise are discussed: the Secretaries of State, of
the Interior, of Agriculture, of Commerce, of Labor, of Energy, and of Veterans Affairs, the
Administrator of the EPA, and the Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating
Terrorism.  The Counsel to the President may also be invited.  Other heads of departments
and agencies and senior officials shall be invited, when appropriate. 
32“Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1, Subject: Organization and Operation of the
Homeland Security Council,” October 29, 2001.
implementation of homeland security policies.”29  The Director of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy was neither named a member of the Homeland
Security Council, nor mentioned among the specific department and agency heads
who would be “invited to attend Council meetings pertaining to their
responsibilities.”30
Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 1 regarding the “Organization and
Operation of the Homeland Security Council,” released on October 30, 2001,
created a “Homeland Security Council Principals Committee,” – as  the “senior
interagency forum under the Homeland Security Council.”31  Also established at this
time was a Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee (HSC/DC) to serve as
the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting
homeland security.  The OSTP Director was not named to these groups. 
Under the directive, eleven “Policy Coordination Committees” (PCC) were
attached to the Homeland Security Council Office to provide interagency
coordination for the development and implementation of homeland security policies
by multiple federal departments and agencies and to coordinate those policies with
State and local government. The committees also are to provide “policy analysis for
consideration by the more senior committees of the HSC system ....”  Members
“shall include representatives from the executive departments, offices and agencies
represented in the HSC/DC” of which the OSTP is not a member.  One PCC deals
with “research and development,” and was to be chaired by a senior director from
the Office of Homeland Security.32  
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34As pointed out, P.L. 94-282, did not create such an “assistant.”
35GAO, Combating Terrorism, p. 87.
36U.S. Commission on National Security/21st  Road Map for National Security: Imperative
for Change, the Phase III Report, February 15, 2001, p. 30, Century (the Hart-Rudman
Commission, convened by the Secretary of Defense).
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)
The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in the Executive Office
of the President (EOP), was established statutorily in 197633 to provide the President
with advice on science and technology (S&T) issues.  The law authorized OSTP to
be headed by a director, who is presidentially nominated and confirmed by the
Senate.  The OSTP Director may be named as the President’s Science and
Technology Advisor.  From time to time Presidents have named their science
advisor an assistant to the President.  This is not mandatory nor statutorily required.
The current OSTP  Director, Dr. John Marburger, was not named an assistant to the
President or science advisor to the President.  OSTP has its own federally funded
research and development center (FFRDC), the Science and Technology Policy
Institute (STPI), currently contracted to the RAND corporation, to conduct policy
analyses and provide other support.
Except for its NSC committee responsibilities, before September 11, 2001,
OSTP did not have specific counterterrorism R&D functions.  Expert group
recommendations were made before then to expand OSTP’s role.  GAO
recommended that “to reduce duplication and leverage resources, ... the Assistant
to the President for Science and Technology,”34 [who, in the past,  has been the
Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy], “[should] ... develop a
strategic plan for research and development to combat terrorism, coordinating this
with federal agencies and state and local authorities.”  GAO said this should be
coordinated with the national strategy to combat terrorism that would have its focal
point in the Executive Office of the President.35  
The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (the Hart-Rudman
Commission), that was convened by the Secretary of Defense, reported in Road Map
for National Security: Imperative for Change the Phase III Report, February 15,
2001.36  It focused on actions to strengthen national security capability broadly
(without focusing specifically on counterterrorism).  The commission recommended
creating a cabinet-level National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with
responsibility for planning, coordinating and integrating various U.S. government
activities involved in homeland defense.  Federal R&D resources, it said,  should be
doubled to strengthen the science base as a general national security defense.  The
Commission urged that OSTP play a paramount role in collecting data about R&D,
in developing policies to strengthen the science base, and that the “president should
empower his Science Advisor to establish non-military R&D objectives that meet
changing national needs, and to coordinate budget development within the relevant
departments and agencies.”  It also recommended that the National Science and
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38Statement of Hon. John H. Marburger, “Science of Bioterrorism: Is the Federal
Government Prepared?,” Hearing before the House Committee on Science, Dec. 5, 2001.
See also: “An Interview With John Marburger: Terrorism, Money, Contacts Top Science
Adviser’s Agenda,”Science, Nov. 23, 2001. 
39Marburger Testimony, Dec. 5, 2001. 
40Statement of Hon. John H. Marburger, III, Director of the OSTP, before the Subcommittee
on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Apr. 10,
2002.
41Interviews with OSTP staff.  See also Hafner, Apr. 11, 2002, and Steve Bunk, “Science
and Homeland Security,” The Scientist, July 8, 2002. 
42David Malakoff and Robert Koenig, “Counterterrorism: U.S. Science Agencies Begin to
Lend a Hand,” Science, Oct. 26, 2001, pp. 761-762; Chris Mooney, “Political Science: The
Bush Administration Snubs Its Science Adviser,”  American Prospect, December 3, 2001.
Technology Council (NSTC), the interagency coordinating group managed by
OSTP, should be strengthened to help identify additional creative, targeted large-
scale governmental scientific and technological initiatives in key fields.37
OSTP’s Evolving Responsibilities for Counterterrorism R&D. (See
Table 4.)  Dr. Marburger testified that after the terrorist attacks, the NSC’s PCC on
Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, which OSTP chairs, “...
initiated briefings from agencies on their bioterrorism-related R&D programs and
on specific projects ... for detecting and tracking threats.”38  Meetings with federal
agencies, he said, typically included representatives of the OMB, OHS, Domestic
Policy Council, Office of the Vice President, and Cabinet Affairs.39  During April
2002 hearings, Dr. Marburger testified that in order to coordinate counterterrorism
R&D, OSTP interacts with relevant federal agencies as well as with “Congress ...
the science community, the private sector and higher education.”40  OSTP sought
advice from the National Academies and from its own federally funded R&D center,
specifically to develop a taxonomy and inventory of agency activities in
“antiterrorism R&D” with the objective of identifying “gaps, duplication, and
opportunities for collaboration.”41  See Appendix 4 for a summary of the report the
National Academies prepared to help the government define counterterrorism R&D
priorities and organizational arrangements. 
After his confirmation, the new OSTP Director eliminated two of the divisions
that had existed previously – the divisions of national security and of environment
– on the grounds that the office was too fragmented.42  At least one critic, an official
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, is reported to have
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Table 4.  Summary of Interagency Coordination for
Counterterrorism R&D, OSTP-related Responsibilities
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) 
OSTP has been assigned responsibilities for:
Immigration Policy (with DOS, DOD, DOE, DOEd, DOJ, FEMA); created 
                IPASS
Border Technology (with CIA and DOJ)
Counter-Nuclear Smuggling Working Group (linked to OHS)
OSTP is also a member of:
Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group, led by
the Department of State,  
Counter Proliferation Program Review Committee, chaired by DOD, and
Interagency group to develop guidelines for select agent regulations to be
promulgated by DHHS and USDA in response to the passage of the
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act, P.L. 107-188
OSTP’s Assistant Director for National Security is also the OHS Senior
Director for R&D
OSTP has relationships with the National Academies [of Science (NAS),
Engineering (NAE), Institute of Medicine (IOM)]
OSTP’s FFRDC (STPI) does counterterrorism work for it; it is run by RAND
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) (managed by OSTP)
Antiterrorism Task Force, which has five working groups:
Radiological, Nuclear and Conventional(RNC) Working Group (CIA,
DOT, DOC, EPA, DOD, NSF, DOE, NSC, DOJ, NRC,  DOS, OMB)
Biological and Chemical Preparedness Working Group (DOD, HHS, CIA,
DOC, DOE, DOT, EPA, NSF, USDA, DOJ/FBI, VA, STATE, DOI,
NASA, Treasury, OMB, NSC, OHS, OSTP)
Rapid Response Working Group (AFRRI, CDC, CIA, DARPA, DOD,
DOEd, DOE, DOI, DOJ, DOT, EPA, FBI, FDA, FEMA, HHS,
NASA, NOAA, NIC, NIOSH, NIST, NRC, NSF, OHS, OMB,
OSHA, State, USDA, USPS, USSS, VA)
Social, Behavioral and Education Sciences (SBE) Working Group (OSTP,
NSF, NIH, DOD, DHHS, VA, NIJ, CDC, OHSA, and ED, with new
members being added from the CIA, EPA, NIOSH, DARPA and
FBI)
Protection of Vulnerable Systems Working Group (connected to
coordination efforts of the Special Advisor to the President for Cyber
Space Security Richard Clarke.  Together Clarke and Marburger co-
chair a R&D Working Group focused on this issue)
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) (under OSTP)
Panel on Combating Terrorism (which is a member of the Senior Advisory
Committee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council)
Not part of OSTP:  President’s Critical Infrastructure Board  (The OSTP director is
a member and co-chair of the R&D Subcommittee relating to information security.)
(Source: Prepared by CRS)
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44The current version was created on September 30, 2001, when President George W. Bush
signed Executive Order 13226.
45See also, Bara Vaida, “Bush High-Tech Council To Discuss Terrorism at First Meeting,”
GovExec.com, Dec. 12, 2001. 
46Audrey T. Leath, “Positive Hearing for OSTP Director Nominee Marburger,” AIP Bulletin
of Science Policy News, Oct. 11, 2001. 
47Richard M. Jones, “First Meeting of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology,” FYI: The AIP Bulletin of Science Policy News, Mar. 13, 2002. 
48Jones, Mar. 13, 2002.
49Available at [http://www.ostp.gov/PCAST/DHSreport/html].
 said  that “eliminating the national security position ‘is a big blow’ to forging links
to the powerful National Security Council ... [on terrorism issues].”43 
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
(PCAST).  PCAST was originally established by President George Bush in 1990
to enable the President to receive advice from the private sector and academic
community on technology, scientific research priorities, and math and science
education.44  The OSTP Director said he would utilize PCAST, which he co-chairs45
for counterterrorism R&D advice.  PCAST would be enlisted to assess issues such
as “how to better mobilize the creativity and energy of private-sector technology
companies in both preventing and responding to terrorism.”46  Subsequently the
President charged PCAST with developing recommendations on “using S&T to
combat terrorism”47 via the PCAST Panel on the Science and Technology of
Combating Terrorism.  This subcommittee was to “examine the role of government
to combat terrorism, identify obsolete regulations, and look at lessons learned by
other nations that experience terrorism.”48  On July 23, 2002, PCAST released a
draft report for public comment, entitled Report on Maximizing the Contribution of
Science and Technology Within the New Department of Homeland Security.49  It
focused on the organization, content, and operation of the R&D in a proposed
Department of Homeland Security. 
PCAST’s Role in Homeland Security Advisory Council.  On March
21, 2002, the President issued Executive Order 13260, entitled “Establishing the
President’s Homeland Security Advisory Council and Senior Advisory Committees
for Homeland Security.”  Composed of 21 nonfederal (private and State and local
government) members appointed by the President,  its purpose is to advise the
President through the Assistant for Homeland Security on a national strategy and
specific strategies to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks and to
recommend ways to improve cooperation and cooperation among various sectors
and information sources.  Among its ex officio members are the Chair and the vice
chair of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council; the Chairman of the
President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee; and the
Chair of the PCAST’s Panel on the Science and Technology of Combating
Terrorism.   Four senior advisory committees (SAC) are to deal with State and Local
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(continued...)
Officials; Academic and Policy Research; Private Sector; and Emergency Services,
Law Enforcement and Public Health and Hospitals.50
Formal Links Between OHS and OSTP  
Formal links between the OHS and the OSTP include a staff member with dual
responsibilities in each agency and the assignment of specific counterterrorism-
related tasks to OSTP in cooperation with OHS. These interactions are discussed
next. 
Assistant OSTP Director Named Senior Director for R&D at OHS.
Dr. Penrose (Parney) Albright was named to the positions of Assistant OSTP
Director, National Security and Senior Director for Research and Development at
the Office of Homeland Security and senior staff member for the PCC on R&D.
Within OSTP, he  reports to the OSTP Associate Director for Science.  Dr. Albright
is a Ph.D. physicist, with experience relating to ballistic and cruise missile defense.
His most recent assignment before coming to OSTP was with DARPA, where he
managed programs in hydrodynamic drag reduction, molecular biology, target
tagging, and speech encoding.  Before that he was with the Science and Technology
Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses.51  Albright’s appointment, according
to Dr. Marburger, will “ ‘provide OHS seamless reach-back into the scientific talent
resident in OSTP staff and [provides] OSTP awareness of the various issues OHS
is confronting, while bringing the resources of the S&T community to bear on
homeland security issues in an efficient and timely manner ....’ ”52
OSTP Responsibilities Relating to Counterterrorism, Student Visas
and Immigration.  During fall 2001 the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security called upon the OSTP Director for scientific and technical advice, to
provide some “science coordination”53 dealing with the federal response relating to
mail security and baggage inspection at airports,54 and to identify counterterrorism
experts in collaboration with the National Coordination Office for Information
Technology R&D in the Commerce Department.55  The OSTP Director was given
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responsibility to work in two specific R&D areas under Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-2, that deals with “Combating Terrorism Through
Immigration Policies,” issued October 29, 2001.  One was to develop, in
cooperation with the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, and Education, and the
Attorney General, and academic institutions, a program to “end the abuse of student
visas and prohibit certain international students from receiving education and
training in sensitive areas, including areas of study with direct application to the
development and use of weapons of mass destruction”56  This would involve
identifying sensitive courses of study, identifying “problematic applicants” for
student visas and denying their applications, and tracking students who receive a
visa by looking at “the proposed major course of study, the status of the individual
as a full-time student, the classes in which the student enrolls, and the source of the
funds supporting the student’s education.” 
A second responsibility mandated by Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-2 required the OSTP Director, in conjunction with the Attorney General
and the Director of Central Intelligence, to recommend methods and resources
needed to use advanced technology to help enforce U.S. immigration laws by
facilitating the identification of, and denying access to, aliens who are suspected of
engaging in or supporting terrorist activity.  Recommendations were also to be made
about using existing databases to detect, identify, locate, and apprehend potential
terrorists.  The Director of OSTP was to submit to the Director of OMB proposed
legislative remedies to overcome legal barriers to data sharing to achieve this
objective.  OSTP’s Director was to make recommendations on technologies and
associated budgetary requirements to the President through the Homeland Security
Council. 
Interagency Panel on Advanced Science Security.  Part of OSTP’s
response to these tasks consisted of its coordination of much of the work of an
interagency working group which refined guidelines regarding student immigration
and courses of study,57 resulting in development of an Administration plan released
on May 7, 2002.  The White House plan proposed creating an Interagency Panel on
Advanced Science Security (IPASS) to screen foreign graduate students and
scientists who apply for visas to study sensitive subjects at U.S. colleges and
universities.  IPASS will be tasked with guarding access to “unique and sensitive”
U.S. education or training that could be used against us or our allies.  It will be
composed of representatives from major U.S. science agencies, as well as officials
from the Departments of State, Justice and Commerce.  Co-chairs of the IPASS will
be appointed by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.  Reportedly, a
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presidential directive is being prepared which will define how IPASS will operate.58
Plans are for visa applications to be screened according to the nationality of the
student, his or her educational background, area of study, and the nature of any
research being conducted at the institution.  An OSTP official said that, “The current
State Department Technology Alert List of 16 broad categories already designated
to trigger additional inquiry on visa applications59 is a starting point of the list of
‘unique and sensitive’ S&T areas IPASS will consider ....”60  Reportedly, a new list
will be developed in cooperation with U.S. educational institutions.  While most
U.S. educators seem pleased with the creation of the panel, they say they felt
excluded from discussions about establishing it and expect to be asked to participate
in panel deliberations in the future.61
OSTP’s Responsibilities Relating to Cybersecurity R&D.  Executive
Order 13231, issued October 16, 2001, gave the OSTP Director a third
responsibility, related to cyber security R&D.  As is described further in Appendix
3 on “Information Security R&D,” the Special Advisor to the President for Cyber
Space Security, is also the Chairman of the President’s Critical Infrastructure Board
and reports both to the NSC and the OHS.  He was required to coordinate with the
OSTP Director to develop a federal R&D program to protect “information systems
for critical infrastructure.”62  These activities are to be coordinated with NSC. 
OSTP’s Role in Other Groups.  According to Dr. Marburger, “Working
closely with OHS, an interagency working group called the “Counter-Nuclear
Smuggling Working Group” has been created to develop a fully coordinated
program for addressing the threat of nuclear smuggling across borders, both
overseas and in the United States.  This working group will develop a strategic plan
with a unified set of program goals and priorities, including within its scope the
programs that implement and deploy current capabilities, as well as programs that
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research and develop new capabilities.  This group is co-chaired with the National
Security Council and [works with] ... the Office of Homeland Security’s Research
and Development Policy Coordinating Committee.”63 
Dr. Marburger testified that “OSTP also is engaged fully in such interagency
groups as the Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group, led
by the Department of State, and the Counter Proliferation Program Review
Committee, chaired by the Department of Defense.”64  It also is participating in an
interagency group to develop guidelines for select agent regulations to be
promulgated by DHHS and USDA in response to the passage of the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, P.L. 107-188.65
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) 
The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) was established by
Executive Order 12881 on November 23, 1993.  This Cabinet-level council is the
principal means for the President to coordinate science, space, and technology
across the government.  The President chairs the NSTC.  Membership consists of
the Vice President, the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, who
at times in the past has been the Director of the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy, cabinet secretaries and agency heads with significant science
and technology responsibilities, and other White House officials.  OSTP manages
the activities of NSTC, which prepares R&D strategies for some topics and
coordinates them across federal agencies.
NSTC’s Committee on National Security (CNS) is charged with providing a
formal mechanism for interagency policy review, planning, and coordination as
well as the exchange of information regarding national security-related R&D.  It
was active during the Clinton Administration.66  The NSTC’s CNS has participated
in “monitoring the research and development subgroup of the interagency Weapons
of Mass Destruction Preparedness Group [PWMD subgroup of the National
Security Council].  ... The CNS was briefed on and discussed the activities and
progress of the R&D subgroup on several occasions.”67  GAO reported that neither
the OSTP nor the NSTC’s CNS have created a national R&D strategy to combat
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WMD-related terrorism and do not coordinate individual agency projects.68 “As a
result,” the management of counterterrorism-related R&D is “self-governing and
highly dependent on voluntary coordination mechanisms.”69 
The Committee on National Security appears to be inactive.  The links, if any,
between the NSTC’s CNS and the National Security Council’s PWMD R&D
Subgroup and the CNS and the  Homeland Security Council’s Policy Coordination
Committee for R&D have not been made known. 
NSTC’s Antiterrorism Task Force.  Shortly after the September 11, 2001
attacks the OSTP Director created a Rapid Response Team within the NSTC
structure.  The team draws on technical experts within relevant federal agencies to
address critical time-sensitive technical issues.  An example of this was OSTP’s
assembling of a technical team to assist the U.S. Postal Service in evaluating the
effectiveness of various proposals for sanitizing mail contaminated with anthrax
spores.70  Also by spring 2002, OSTP’s director had established an interagency
Antiterrorism Task Force which incorporated the Rapid Response Team and also
included other working groups dealing with 
! Radiological, Nuclear and Conventional [Threats and Vulnerabilities] ,
! Biological and Chemical Preparedness, and
! Social, Behavioral and Education Sciences.
For a description of each of the groups’ functions and members, see Appendix 1.
A separate NSTC Protection of Vulnerable Systems working group was
created.  It is “concerned with the nation’s physical infrastructure and is intimately
connected with the coordination efforts of the Special Advisor to the President for
Cyber Space Security Richard Clarke.”71
OSTP is using these groups to conduct interagency reviews of federal R&D
programs “... to assist agencies in determining which R&D efforts constitute the
highest national priority items and should be integrated into their budgets, thereby
reducing gaps and inefficiencies.”72  These activities also permit sharing of
information about agencies’ R&D program activities and outputs.  Each working
group had originally been directed to “set ... a five-year research agenda by August
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1, 2002.”73  According to OSTP that information will be used in preparing the
FY2004 budget request.74 
Proposals to Coordinate Counterterrorism R&D in
a Department or Agency
Some observers argue that the coordination mechanisms established in OSTP,
OHS and other agencies as described above are inadequate.  They say that
fragmentation in priority-setting and the conduct of counterterrorism and homeland
security R&D programs and policies imperils the nation’s security.  Core R&D
priorities, they contend, should be set by a homeland security agency or department
which would also have responsibility for managing the conduct of some R&D.
Others disagree or urge caution when moving some R&D to a new department.  
Even before the terrorist attacks, expert group recommendations were made
to create a new counterterrorism agency, which would coordinate federal
counterterrorism R&D.  The Gilmore Commission recommended that the President
should establish a statutorily authorized, cabinet-level National Office for
Combating Terrorism in the Executive Office of the President.  It would have five
major sections, each headed by an assistant director.  One section, that would focus
on Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and National
Standards, would develop a comprehensive plan for long-range research for
combating terrorism, “provide direction and priorities for research and
development and related test and evaluation ... for combating terrorism as well as
for developing nationally recognized standards for equipment and laboratory
protocols and techniques, with the ultimate objective being official certification.”75
It “would have budget and program and authority to review federal agency
programs and budgets to ensure compliance with the priorities it established in the
national strategy,” [this is more budget approval authority than was granted to the
Office of Homeland Security]; would coordinate national laboratory R&D to deal
with terrorism, and would gather and disseminate information about off-the-shelf
research and technology to combat terrorism.76  The Commission recommended
that the TSWG, which also serves “as an adjunct of the ‘Interagency Working
Group on Counterterrorism’ under the National Security Council ... become an
adjunct to the National Office for Combating Terrorism in the same manner that
it now serves in the NSC process and that it expand its coordination role for
technical aspects of RDT&E for combating terrorism.”77  The commission also
recommended a greater role for OSTP in setting federal R&D priorities and that the
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proposed Assistant Director for RDT&E and National Standards either enter into
a formal relationship with OSTP or have appropriate members of the OSTP staff
detailed to the Office for Combating Terrorism on a rotational basis.78 
In June 2002, a National Academies’ report observed that federal
counterterrorism R&D was fragmented among agencies and that more
interdisciplinary, cross-cutting work was needed.  It recommended creation of a
“federal office or agency with central responsibility for homeland security strategy
and coordination and [that] ... this organization [should] have the structure and
framework necessary to bring responsibility, accountability, and resources together
to effectively utilize the nation’s science and engineering capabilities.”  The report
also supported creating a Homeland Security Institute to help set priorities and to
provide technical capabilities and analysis, including test-bed evaluation, to support
the organization.  An UnderSecretary for Technology was needed, “[t]o provide a
focal point for guiding research and technology development programs across the
department, and most importantly, engaging commitments from the major science,
engineering, and medical science agencies that will remain outside the proposed
new department.”79  The OSTP Director, according to the report,  should “lead an
interagency process to develop the S&T research priorities for counterterrorism.
These priorities should be responsive to, and aligned with, the overall
counterterrorism agenda, developed by OHS and budget guidance should be
promulgated to agencies to support their participation in appropriate programs.”80
A draft report released in July 2002 by the President’s Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology (PCAST) recommended creating a DHS with an Under
Secretary for Science and Technology with a variety of R&D responsibilities and
a “Homeland Security federally funded research and development center (FFRDC)”
... to do systems analysis, support of systems engineering and “red teaming” (“the
use of innovative individuals who emulate terrorists in selecting targets and
planning attacks, based on simulation and controlled table-top and fielded exercises
and tests”).  It said that the DHS should also have laboratory and operational test
and evaluation functions and a Homeland Security Advanced Research Agency to
manage external R&D – primarily a funding conduit to industry and academia.
PCAST also proposed that federal agency counterterrorism R&D activities be
inventoried to assist Congress and DHS in identifying appropriate R&D
responsibilities for DHS and gaps in coverage.81
In several documents released during the spring of 2002, the Administration
made a case for including some R&D responsibilities in a homeland security
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department.  These were represented in the Administration’s National Strategy for
Homeland Security, released in July 2002.  It concluded,
To date, research and development activities in support of homeland security
have been underfunded, evolutionary, short-term in nature, fragmented across
too many departments, and heavily reliant on spin-offs from the national
security and medical sectors.  Many of the involved agencies have little
frontline knowledge of homeland security and little or no experience in
technology acquisition and supporting research 82
It proposed creating a Department of Homeland Security which would
coordinate homeland security R&D, create a centralized federal laboratory system
R&D, and develop an independent analytical and evaluation capability for testing
of technologies.83  Many of these proposals were subsequently incorporated into
H.R. 5005.  See below in the section entitled “Counterterrorism R&D Procurement,
Analysis, or Evaluation Centers.”
While some observers argue that core counterterrorism R&D should be
consolidated in a homeland security department, others, such as the Brookings
Institution in a July 15, 2002 report, Assessing the Department of Homeland
Security, disagree or urge caution about moving some R&D to a new department.
Brookings  concluded that creation of a department should be deferred until the
Administration’s homeland security R&D strategy is more fully developed and that
more attention should be given to prevention and R&D priorities that deal with
controlling dangerous materials, sensors, surveillance and data management.84
Legislation to Authorize a Homeland Security
Office or Department With R&D Responsibilities 
Some say that because the Office of Homeland Security was created by
executive order and not by statute, Congress has little direct oversight of its
activities, except for its authority to fund White House offices.  Also, there has
been criticism that since the OHS has no specific budgetary authority, it will not
be able to effectively establish and coordinate policies and command other
agencies, and that it does not share information and data with other agencies.85
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(continued...)
Bills have been introduced in the 107th Congress to authorize both an OHS
and to create a new department of homeland security, both with R&D coordination
responsibilities.86  The bills with the most legislative action are H.R. 5005, passed
in the House, and S. 2452, under consideration in the Senate.  Both bills would
create homeland security departments, with an Under Secretary for Science and
Technology and varying degrees of responsibility for counterterrorism science and
technology.87  S.2794 was introduced on July 25, 2002 and referred to the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs.  Many of its provisions are similar to the
original proposal the President sent to Congress, introduced as H.R. 5005, that was
amended before House passage.  
H.R. 5005, “To Create a Department of Homeland Security”
On June 6, 2002, the President sent Congress a proposal for a Department of
Homeland Security.88  This was followed by legislation sent up to Congress and
introduced June 24, 2002 as H.R. 5005.  It differed somewhat from the
organization outlined in the President’s homeland security proposal document.89
Following hearings and mark-up,90 the House passed H.R. 5005 on July 26, 2002.
The bill would create a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with total R&D
responsibilities estimated at $500 to $600 million, including $300 million for
programs that would be newly authorized, according to the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO).91  See Table 5. 
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The existing OHS would continue in the Executive Office of the President;
it is not clear if the existing OHS Homeland Security Council Policy Coordination
Committee on R&D would continue.92  The proposed DHS would have four
operational units, each led by an Under Secretary: (1) Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection; (2) Science and Technology; (3) Border and
Transportation Security; and (4) Emergency Preparedness and Response.  Most of
DHS’s research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) functions would be
under the jurisdiction of the Under Secretary for Science and Technology (created
Table 5.  Estimated R&D Funding in the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Proposed in H.R. 5005
(Dollars in Millions)
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Total: About $500 million to $600 million
Sources: The CBO reference is: Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate on H.R. 5005,
Homeland Security Act of 2002, as Ordered Reported by the Select Committee on Homeland
Security on July 19, 2002, July 23, 2002; AAAS data is from:  AAAS, “House Approves Bill to
C r e a t e  a   D e p t .  o f  H o m e l a n d  S e c u r i t y . . . ” ,  A u g .  2 8 ,  2 0 0 2 ,
[http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/dhs0828.htm.].  The OMB source is OMB, Annual Report to Congress
on Combating Terrorism, June 24, 2002, p. 27.
by Title III), who would have responsibility to fund and administer the agency’s
intramural and extramural research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
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with respect to developing countermeasures against chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear weapons and other “emerging terrorist” threats (but not
human health-related R&D); to establish a government-wide counterterrorism
R&D strategy; and to coordinate with other agencies to eliminate duplication and
fill unmet needs; and facilitate technology deployment.  
The Under Secretary for Science and Technology would have responsibility
for several Department of Energy (DOE) R&D programs to be transferred to DHS,
excluding programs and activities relating to the U.S. strategic nuclear posture.
DOE programs proposed for transfer include chemical and biological national
security programs; some parts of the non-proliferation and verification R&D
program directly relating to homeland security; nuclear smuggling; the nuclear
assessment program of international materials protection and cooperation directly
relating to homeland security; life sciences activities of the biological and
environmental research program relating to microbial pathogens, computational
gene sequencing technology development, and databases of microbial and other
DNA sequence data; the advanced scientific computing research program at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; and the Environmental Measurements
Laboratory. AAAS estimated the above DOE programs could total about $100
million.94
Proposed for transfer from the Department of Defense is the Biological
Defense Homeland Security Support Program and Biological Counter-Terrorism
Research Program.  DHS would not have responsibility for most DOD bioterrorism
R&D. The Agriculture Department’s Plum Island Animal Disease Center (R&D
on foreign animal diseases) would be transferred to the new department.
Regarding the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the DHHS
Secretary, in collaboration with the DHS Secretary would set priorities for certain
DHHS R&D for countermeasures for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
and other terrorist threats. DHS would not have responsibility for funding and
conduct of R&D at DHHS.  Projects would be carried out in DHHS’s National
Institutes of Health (NIH), largely in the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID) and in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Under Title III, the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology is
authorized to establish one or more FFRDCs for independent analysis (Sec. 304),
and is required to establish one or more  university-based centers for homeland
security, that would have to meet 15 specific criteria to be funded (Sec. 307).  The
Under Secretary for Science and Technology would need to consider geographic
distribution in the operation of RDT&E programs so as to “ensure that colleges,
universities, private research institutes, and companies (and consortia thereof) from
as many areas of the United States as practicable participate” (Sec.307).  At the
same time, the Under Secretary is specifically directed to use merit review
guidelines in awarding funds.  
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Under Title III, the bill would create a Homeland Security Science and
Technology Coordination Council to establish R&D priorities within DHS; a
Homeland Security Institute to, among other things, conduct analysis and
evaluation of the effectiveness of security measures; a Homeland Security Science
and Technology Advisory Committee, composed of external experts, first
responders, and other stakeholders; a Technology Clearinghouse to encourage
innovative solutions and screen proposals in coordination with TSWG.  The Under
Secretary for Science and Technology could use the expertise of any federal
laboratory and could select a “headquarters”laboratory at any national laboratory,
to which other laboratories might be added.  The bill would also create a science
and technology national “Net Guard,” to help information systems recover after
attack (sec. 213).
Section 202 specifies that the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center, (currently run by two DOE national laboratories, Sandia and Los Alamos,
with a budget of $20 million for FY2002)95 would be transferred to the DHS Under
Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection created by Title
II of the bill.  The Border and Transportation Security Division of the proposed
DHS would include a small amount of R&D, which, according to AAAS, would
include Coast Guard R&D ($24 million in FY2003), the Transportation Security
Administration’s aviation security R&D (a preliminary estimate of $47 million in
FY 2003), and the Agriculture Department’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service R&D portfolio ($29 million in FY 2003).96
The DHS Secretary would have special authority for a period of five years
after enactment to waive specific procurement laws in R&D pilot projects (Sec.
731); the ability to implement a set of liability protections for manufacturers of
innovative antiterrorism technologies (Sec. 751); and authority over DHHS
strategic stockpile functions as defined in P.L. 107-188, the Public Health Security
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Sec. 905).  The bill
would add homeland security to the list of topics on which the Director of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy is to advise the President, and the OSTP
Director is mandated to “work in close consultation and cooperation” with the
Office of Homeland Security (Sec. 909).
S. 2452, “National Homeland Security and Combating
Terrorism Act”
A cabinet-level Department of National Homeland Security (DNHS),
including a Directorate of Science and Technology was proposed in S. 2452
(Lieberman), which had been reported favorably in May, 2002.  A substitute bill
was filed and agreed to on July 25, 2002 by the Committee on Governmental
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Affairs.97  The bill would create a National Office of Combating Terrorism in the
White House and a DNHS headed by a Secretary with five directorates, each
headed by an Under Secretary.  They would deal with Border and Transportation
Protection; Intelligence; Critical Infrastructure Protection; Emergency Preparedness
and Response; Science and Technology; and Immigration Affairs.  The Under
Secretary for Science and Technology created by the bill (Sec. 135) would have
somewhat broader responsibilities than in H.R. 5005 to support and conduct R&D;
to establish a science and technology strategy for countermeasures R&D; to
coordinate with other agencies, including OSTP; and to develop “technology
roadmaps” to achieve goals.  The new DNHS would also set priorities for, and
manage in collaboration with DHHS, certain DHHS bioterrorism countermeasures
R&D under joint agreements between DNHS and DHHS.  
To be transferred to the DNHS from DOE and its laboratories are the
following R&D activities: chemical and biological national security and programs
and activities supporting domestic response of the nonproliferation and verification
R&D program; nuclear smuggling programs related to homeland security within
the proliferation detection program of the nonproliferation and verification R&D
program, “except that the programs and activities described in this clause may be
designated by the President either for transfer to the Department or for joint
operation by the Secretary and the Secretary of Energy;” nuclear assessment
program and activities of the assessment, detection cooperation program of the
international materials protection and cooperation program; and the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory.  These functions would be managed by an Office of
Laboratory Research, which would also administer any funds transferred from
DNHS to DHHS for R&D.  The Office of Laboratory Research would also
establish and direct new R&D facilities, include a science advisor to the Under
Secretary and support staff to deal with research priorities related to biological and
chemical weapons, the development of drugs, devices, and biologics; and R&D on
biological  and chemical threat agents.  The Lieberman substitute would not
transfer programs from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to the new
Department of Homeland Security.  Instead, it would create an Office for National
Laboratories, responsible for coordinating and utilizing Department of Energy
facilities “to create a networked laboratory system” to support the DNHS’s
missions.  
It is estimated that the DNHS proposed in the bill would have responsibility
for R&D funding totaling somewhere between $600 million and $650 million,
including $125 million worth of DHHS programs, but exclusive of other existing
DHHS programs over which the new department may have some authority.  See
Table 6.
S. 2452 would create a Science and Technology Council, composed of federal
agency officials, to set R&D priorities and coordinate government programs.  The
Under Secretary would have authority to carry out RDT&E and some prototype
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projects; DOE’s national laboratories could be used to support departmental
missions.  An “Acceleration Fund for Research and Development of Homeland
Security Technologies,” to support the external R&D, would be authorized at $200
million for FY2003, using interagency groups to establish its priorities.  The bill
would establish a Homeland Security Science and Technology Council, under the
NSTC to assist with interagency coordination.  To encourage technology
development and deployment, the bill would create a Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency (SARPA), an Office on Risk Analysis and Assessment, an Office
of Technology Evaluation and Transition, which would operate in an interagency
manner modeled on the TSWG. 
Table 6.  Estimated R&D Funding in the Department of
National Homeland Security (DNHS) Proposed in S. 2452
(Lieberman substitute, agreed to by Senate Committee on
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Total: About $600 million to $650 million for DNHS in S. 2452 (exclusive of non-specified DHHS
programs)
Sources: The CBO reference refers to: Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate on H.R. 5005,
Homeland Security Act of 2002, as Ordered Reported by the Select Committee on Homeland
Security on July 19, 2002, July 23, 2002; AAAS data is from: AAAS, “House Approves Bill to
Create a  Dept. of Homeland Security,” Aug. 28, 2002, [http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/dhs0828.htm.]
The Under Secretary of the Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and
Response would be given responsibility for “select agent” registration activities
(which would affect the conduct of R&D in academic and other nongovernmental
laboratories) and for DHHS strategic stockpile functions, both mandated by P.L. 107-
188 (Sec. 134).  Section 133 of S. 2452 would transfer the R&D-intensive Computer
Security Division of NIST to the Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection.
The inspection service of USDA’s Animal, Plant, and Health Inspection Service
(APHIS), would be transferred to DNHS, as would the Coast Guard and the
Transportation Security Administration (both of which have R&D functions ) (Sec.
131).  Under section 133, research and analysis units would be established to assess
vulnerabilities and protective measures for  critical infrastructure, such as energy,
transportation, water, and so forth.  Some cybersecurity and physical security for
infrastructure functions would be conducted within the DNHS (sec. 133).  Also, the
bill would create a National Emergency Technology Guard.
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99Joseph S. Nye, “How to Protect the Homeland,” New York Times, Editorial, Sept.25, 2001.
100DARPA is the central R&D agency for the Defense Dept.  It manages and directs selected
basic and applied R&D projects and pursues research and technology where risk and payoff
are both very high for military missions.  DARPA gives its program managers considerable
autonomy to select creative university and industrial scientists to conduct problem-solving
R&D at the cutting edge without having to adhere to rigorous competitive awards
procedures customarily used in awarding federal grants and contracts.  See Maxine Singer,
“Answers From Outside the Box,” Washington Post, Sept. 14, 2001, p. A21 and William B.
Bonvillian and Kendra V. Sharp, “Homeland Security Technology,” Issues in Science and
technology OnLine, Winter 2001.  A proposal for a DARPA-like program at NIH was made
in Testimony of Richard Klausner, M.D., Senior Fellow and Special Advisor for
Counterterrorism, National Academy of Sciences Before the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, Feb. 5, 2002.
101Albert R. Hunt, “An Accelerated Agenda for the Terrorism Threat,” Wall Street Journal,
October 25, 2001, p. A21. 
102“U.S. Army Seeks Hollywood Theories,” MSNBC News, Oct. 8, 2001. See also:
[http://www.ceto.quantico/usmc.mil/about.asp].
103Ariana Eunjung Cha, “High-Tech Firms Vie to Fight Terrorism, Government Deluged by
Security Ideas That Are More Practical Than Innovative,” Washington Post, Mar. 31, 2002.`
104The importance of procuring or adapting commercial off-the-shelf technologies for
security/defense-related needs was underscored in DOD’s Quadrennial Defense Review
Report, issued on September 30, 2001. (Richard M. Jones, “DOD Report Calls for 3%
Investment in S&T,” FYI: The AIP Bulletin of Science Policy News, No. 130, Oct. 18, 2001.
See also Statement of OSTP Director John Marburger at AAAS Symposium on “The War
(continued...)
Counterterrorism R&D Procurement, Analysis, or
Evaluation Centers
Proposals have been made to create dedicated counterterrorism R&D analysis
and evaluation centers.  These vary, but include such concepts as a RAND-like
FFRDC,99 an enhanced Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for
counterterrorism R&D which would use DARPA’s special R&D procurement
procedures to rapidly develop antiterrorism technologies,100 a new “Manhattan”
project,101 special counterterrorism forecasting centers for creative R&D,102 and a
homeland security institute with testing capabilities.  Both H.R. 5005 and S. 2452
contain proposals to create these kinds of organizations.  Among the policy issues
likely to be considered in assessing these proposals is the value of continuing, but
enlarging, the functions of existing units versus establishing new mechanisms
dedicated to homeland security.  (For details about proposals made before January
2002, see CRS Report RL31202, at pages 22 to 24.) 
Creative R&D Funding Mechanisms
Reportedly, the private sector has been actively submitting proposals and ideas
for counterterrorism technology to the government and the government “is being
courted with an aggressiveness seldom matched.”103  In addition, DOD has initiated
several creative programs to develop counterterrorism R&D technology.104  Also,
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On Terrorism: What Does It Mean for Science?,” Dec. 18, 2001 and Jennifer B. Lee,
“Federal Agents Look to Adapt Private Technology,” New York Times, Jan. 14, 2002.)  In
addition, to TSWG, DOD has initiated several programs to enhance cooperation with
industry to obtain R&D and technology to combat terrorism.  The DOD FY2002 budget
request included a proposal for a Quick Reaction Special projects (QRSP) initiative that was
not funded, and funding for it was requested again in the FY2003 budget.  The stated
objective of the initiative was to give DOD budgetary flexibility to enhance DOD’s ability
to respond rapidly to urgent needs using technology.  (Statement of the Honorable Ronald
M. Sega, Director Defense Research and Engineering Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Apr. 10, 2002.)
 In-Q-Tel, a private nonprofit venture capital firm set up and financed by the Central
Intelligence Agency in late 1999 has been financing start-up companies in order to obtain
new technologies.  Since the September terrorist attacks, it, reportedly, has received many
calls from innovators and firms seeking to develop counterterrorism technologies.  Some
believe that DOD should consider a model like this to obtain technology. (Amy Cortese,
“Suddenly, Uncle Sam Wants to Bankroll You,” New York Times, Dec. 30, 2001;  Shannon
Henry, “In-Q-Tel, Investing in Intrigue; CIA Unit Scours Country for Useful Technologies,”
Washington Post, July 1, 2002, p. E01.)  “Recently, the Army began considering the creation
of a $50 million venture fund modeled after In-Q-Tel.” (Cortese, op. cit.)
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) held a conference on
“Scientists Helping America,” on March 11-13, 2002.  It was co-sponsored by the U.S.
Special Operations Command ... and brought  researchers to come to Washington, D.C. to
learn about the technical areas where their help is needed and how to apply for contracts.
DOD was particularly interested in researchers who have never worked with DOD, and who
might have innovative ideas in nine key technical areas: advanced training systems, batteries
and fuel cells, bioengineering and chemical/biological defense, directed energy weapons,
wide-bandwidth reach-back communications, remote sensing, signature reduction,
underwater communications and unmanned systems. (“DARPA, Special Operations
Command Invite Scientists To Help America,” DARPA News Release, Jan. 15, 2002.)
Reportedly, since September 11th, DARPA has created an Information Exploration
Office, that “...develops technology to identify global targets and monitor them until the
weapon arrives; then it takes over control of the weapon. John Poindexter, who was national
security adviser under President Reagan, heads the new Information awareness Office,
which is developing a technology, called “total information awareness,” that will detect,
track, and pre-empt attacks by identifying terrorist networks through behavior such as
financial transactions. The system prototype is expected to be ready in September.”
(William New, “White House: Back to the Future,” National Journal, June 15, 2002.)
105Lauren Hafner, “S&T Response to Emerging Antiterror Needs Requires Flexibility,
Senate Panel Hears,” Washington Fax, Apr. 11, 2002. 
OSTP Director Marburger testified in April 2002 that there are technologies or uses
that do not fit within the “purview of the TSWG,” and “the government is ‘still
struggling to cope with generic or general proposals that are coming from the private
sector for addressing the vulnerabilities of large systems,’ such as energy,
transportation and the mail, that ‘do not generally yield to individual technology
support on a small scale.’ ”105  On May 22, 2002, he testified before the Senate
Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee’s Science, Technology and Space
Subcommittee, that the Administration was considering expanding the interagency
Technical Support Working Group to create an “R&D clearinghouse that would
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manage proposals for combating terrorism.”106  “The procurement and review process
of the Technical Support Working Group ...,” he said, “ ‘seem[s] to us to be working
quite well ....’  The ... Administration is considering broadening the mission so the
panel would be charged to ‘solicit, review and respond to unsolicited ideas across
broad categories.’ ”  He added that an expanded TSWG would not obviate the review
responsibilities of other existing agencies but “would attempt to eliminate funding
duplication between agencies.”107  The “White House.” he said, “also is
contemplating creating a central web site listing agency information and points of
contact relating to technology approaches for security and emergency preparedness
and response, as well as solicitations and instructions for submitting ideas to a central
R&D clearinghouse.”108
Legislative Proposals.  As noted above, H.R. 5005 would create a
Technology Clearinghouse to encourage innovative solutions and screen proposals
in coordination with TSWG.  Similarly, S. 2452 would create an Office of
Technology Evaluation and Transition which would operate in an interagency manner
modeled on TSWG.  At least two other bills address this issue.
S. 2037, “Science and Technology Emergency Mobilization Act.”  Provisions
to use the TSWG model, including a web site and interagency concept, were included
in S. 2037, reported amended on June 27, by the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation.  Among other things, the bill would establish a Center for
Civilian Homeland Security Technology Evaluation within the executive branch to
evaluate innovative technologies relating to security and to serve as a national
clearinghouse for such technologies.
H.R. 4629, “To Encourage and Support Innovative Proposals to Enhance
Homeland Security.”  Introduced on May 1, 2002, and referred to the Committee on
Government Reform, this bill would direct the Administrator of the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy, located in OMB, to establish a Government-wide program to
encourage and recognize contractor innovation and excellence in facilitating the
defense of the United States against, or recovery from, terrorism or nuclear,
biological, chemical, or radiological attack. It also directs the Administrator to
establish a pilot program under which the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, Commerce,
Transportation, and the Treasury could streamline acquisition procedures for  using
commercial, off-the-shelf items.
Proposals for a Homeland Security Institute
Proposals to create a homeland security institute have been made by both expert
groups and legislators.  As discussed above, the President, in his Homeland Security
Strategy document, as well as PCAST and the National Academies proposed creating
a unit with capability to perform independent homeland security analysis and
evaluation functions.  The units proposed would be responsible for a variety of
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functions, including RDT&E, analysis and evaluation of technologies.  These and
other proposals are discussed next. 
National Academies’ Proposal.  The National Academies concluded that
because “technical capabilities to provide the analysis necessary to support” a DHS
or OHS “do not currently exist in the government in a united and comprehensive
form,” a Homeland Security Institute to provide technical analysis and support should
be established as a “a dedicated, contracted, not-for-profit organization that would
“serve the organization [whether a DHS or OHS] that sets priorities for homeland
security by performing the following functions”: 
• Systems analysis, risk analysis, and simulation and modeling to determine
the vulnerabilities of the nation’s critical infrastructures and the
effectiveness of the systems deployed to reduce them.
• Sophisticated economic and policy analysis to assess the distributed costs
and benefits of alternative approaches to enhancing security.
• Red teaming to evaluate the effectiveness of measures deployed to enhance
the security of target institutions, facilities, and infrastructure.
• Identification of instances when common standards and protocols are
necessary to ensure interoperability and effective utilization of tools
developed for field operators and first responders. The institute would
cooperate with relevant federal agencies, such as NIST, in the development
of these standards.
• Assistance for agencies in establishing testbeds to evaluate the
effectiveness  of technologies under development and to assess the
appropriateness of such technologies for deployment.
• Design of metrics and use of these metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of
homeland security programs throughout the government agencies and at
national laboratories.
Design of and support for the conduct of exercises and simulations.109
H.R. 4029, “National Integrative Center for Homeland Security”.
Introduced on March 20, 2002, the bill would require the Director of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to establish and operate a center to provide
a coordinated, science-based approach to enhance the nation’s homeland security and
to “establish a university-affiliated homeland security program that integrates ...
information services, research, development, evaluation, education, training, and field
delivery of responder services ....” The bill was referred to the Committee on
Transportation Infrastructure. 
Related Proposals in H.R. 5005 and S. 2452.  The House-passed bill,
H.R. 5005, would create a Homeland Security Institute along the lines of the
Academies’ proposal.  In addition, both H.R. 5005 and S. 2452 would permit a
homeland security department to utilize national laboratories for the conduct of
RDT&E.  H.R. 5005 would permit designation of a headquarters laboratory and use
of other national labs.  S. 2452 would give the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology authority to carry out RDT&E and some prototype projects, as well as
to use DOE’s national laboratories to support departmental missions.  The Senate bill
would create  an Office for National Laboratories to establish a networked laboratory
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system to support the DNHS’s missions.  A proposal to create a DARPA-like
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (SARPA) was included in S. 2452.
The Senate bill does not propose creation of a Homeland Security Institute, but it
would create an office of Risk Analysis and Assessment, with responsibility to
evaluate scientific findings. 
Proposals for Science and Technology Responders
H.R. 4546, the DOD reauthorization bill for FY2003, which passed the House
on May 9, 2002, would create a center for the transfer of military technology to
emergency “first responders.”  (The Senate-passed version does not contain the
provision; a conference is underway.) It would make available to domestic first
responders cutting-edge technology that the federal government has funded for the
military.  The center would be run by a nonprofit entity that can transfer defense
technologies.  H.R. 5005 would create a science and technology national “Net
Guard,” to help information systems recover after attack.  S. 2452 would create a
National Emergency Technology Guard with broader areas of application.  
Options to Modify Federal Organization for
Interagency Priority-setting and Coordination
 
Debates continue about the most effective and efficient way to set priorities and
to fund and manage counterterrorism R&D that is now conducted separately in
different federal agencies and that is coordinated through mechanisms attached to the
Executive Office of the President or other mechanisms for specific R&D areas.  This
is a complex problem because policy decisions need to conform with the requisites
of both security and the conduct of science.  Homeland security requirements help
define the R&D areas which necessitate coordinated governmental action.  Given the
character of today’s terrorist threats, these involve a vast and diverse range of issues
involving virtually every scientific and technical discipline and application, such as
communications, health, and transportation.  At the same time, the conduct of
effective R&D compels attention to the need to balance long-range and more short-
term, applied research; and to develop and test, and then to procure and deploy,
efficient and effective technological responses.  Questions have been raised about
whether there are gaps in coverage of some areas and the potential for wasteful
duplication of resources in other areas as more funds are made available for
counterterrorism R&D and agencies vie to share these resources.  There are also
issues about which counterterrorism R&D functions should be combined in a
homeland security department and which others should be coordinated at the
interagency level through  the OSTP, NSTC, and OHS, or by a proposed Under
Secretary for Science and Technology in a new department, even if those R&D
functions continue to be supported and conducted by existing federal agencies.
Coordination By Offices in the Executive Office of the
President: Policy Issues
OSTP and OHS in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) have principal
responsibility for coordination of counterterrorism R&D.  The Technical Support
Working Group, led by Departments of  State and of Defense, and comprised of most
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other federal agencies as members, also coordinates funding and development of
some antiterrorism technologies and equipment of use to more than one agency.
These arrangements were summarized above in Tables 3 and 4.  
There are several advantages to coordinating counterterrorism R&D priority-
setting and collaboration through offices in the EOP.  These offices can marshal
agency personnel effectively and quickly to develop policies and discuss priorities in
rapidly changing areas since a coordination apparatus already exists.  Also, these
bodies advise the President on policy and are composed largely of senior-level agency
and cabinet officials who have authority to set and enforce policies.  The major
disadvantage is that these offices and groups do not have budgetary authority over
any programs or agencies. 
In order to achieve better coordination at this level, the National Academies
stressed that “OMB should prepare and issue jointly with OSTP an annual budget
crosscut describing how the present and proposed budgets reflect the S&T priorities
for countering terrorism.  A joint letter would be transmitted to Congress, with the
budget proposed the following January.”110  Also, OMB, according to the National
Academies, should  improve its definitions and data collection about counterterrorism
R&D in collaboration with the OSTP.  Regarding OMB’s Annual Report to Congress
on Combating Terrorism, it concluded that: 
... [T]he definition of “research,” and assurance of its consistent interpretation
across the agencies, need more work.  Categories like “critical infrastructure
protection” are not distinct from “counterterrorism,” so that the funding
representation is not unique.  Further refinement of the budgeting process at all
stages, together with tighter coordination within the EOP, will help assure the
coherence of agency programs and their conformity with Presidential priorities.
OMB must also work with and support OSTP in coordinating agency activities
and offering budget guidance. [It recommended that] ... OMB’s Annual Report
to Congress on Combating Terrorism should include a description of progress
toward achieving the goals of the S&T agenda for countering terrorism as well
as actual budget appropriations in suitable activity categories and by agency.111
OSTP and NSTC have a history of effective coordination in some functional
R&D program areas (especially for interagency programs that have been designated
as presidential initiatives or for which Congress enacted legislation mandating R&D
coordination, notably global climate change and information technology
development).  Thus, it is possible that NSTC’s antiterrorism task force working
groups could play an effective role in coordinating programs if the President
emphasized using them. OSTP also has well-established relationships with other
federal agencies, the scientific community, academia, and the National Academies.
It has a nongovernmental advisory body, PCAST, and its own FFRDC to conduct
policy analyses.  However, since President Bush did not name his OSTP Director as
science advisor and the OSTP Director is not a member of several core bodies in the
OHS, the OSTP Director may not have authority needed to convince other agencies
to take action relating to counterterrorism R&D. 
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There is little information about the role played in coordinating homeland
security R&D by the Homeland Security Council’s Policy Coordinating Committee
on R&D (HSC’s PCC on R&D).  Coordination by an OHS group like this offers the
advantage of linking R&D priorities directly to intelligence about threats and also to
the President’s policies to deal with terrorism.  OSTP is a member of this PCC.
Linkages between the PCC on R&D and the NSTC’s antiterrorism working groups
have not been described.  These two groups could continue to provide a basis for
interagency R&D coordination even if a homeland security department were created
since neither proposed department, that is DHS nor DNHS, would have the neutral
and centralized R&D coordination authority that extends throughout the government,
as the PCC on R&D does. 
Both H.R. 5005 and S. 2452 propose mechanisms for coordinating R&D.  The
Under Secretary for Science and Technology in each bill has responsibility for
coordinating R&D for units within the department.  However, the coordination
mechanism proposed in S. 2452 (the Science and Technology Council and the
Homeland Security Science and Technology Council) seems to have wider authority
to coordinate and interact with R&D programs and agencies outside of the proposed
department.  In H.R. 5005, the responsibilities of the proposed coordination
mechanism (the Homeland Security Science and Technology Coordination Council)
are more limited to coordinating R&D within the proposed DHS.  
H.R. 5005 contains provisions which appear to maintain the OHS and which
link formally OSTP and OHS.  The Senate bill, S. 2452, does not mention OHS and
creates instead a statutorily authorized Office of Combating Terrorism in the White
House which is to work cooperatively with the OSTP Director and the DNHS
Secretary and others in developing strategies and programs.  OSTP has a wider role
in the coordination, strategy, priority-setting and budgetary mechanisms established
in S. 2452 than in H.R. 5005.  It remains to be determined what span of authority a
final version of a department of homeland security would have to monitor and
coordinate counterterrorism R&D for programs remaining outside of the department
and for which it would have no budgetary authority and what kind of links should
there be between a homeland security department and existing interagency
coordination mechanisms.  This question may be important because other agencies
might perceive the proposed new department’s R&D priority-setting and coordination
activities being biased by the self-interest of its mission.
Interagency Coordination for Bioterrorism R&D.  It should also be noted
that separate priority-setting and coordination mechanisms have been established for
bioterrorism R&D and for information security R&D. 
For FY 2003, R&D spending for defense against bioterrorism was requested at
$2.435 billion, an almost 5-fold increase over FY2002.  Both agencies with major
roles in this area, DOD and DHHS, have identified detailed priorities for FY2003.
(See Appendix 2 for detailed information about federal agency bioterrorism R&D
programs and coordination.)  
Formal bioterrorism R&D coordination mechanisms have been developed
within and between DOD and DHHS, probably because of the importance of
bioterrorism R&D, the amount of resources being devoted to it.  DHHS and DOD
CRS-40
112See Appendix Table 2. 
sponsor the bulk of federal bioterrorism R&D.  See Table 7.  In addition, Section 108
of P.L. 107-188, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002, created an “Interdepartmental Working Group on
Bioterrorism and Other Public Health Emergencies,” chaired by the Secretary of
DHHS and composed of major federal agency heads, to recommend policies relating
to the prevention, preparedness, and response to bioterrorism and other public health
emergencies.  Section 102 of P.L. 107-188 gave a statutory basis to the position of
Assistant Secretary of Public Health Emergency Preparedness that the DHHS
Secretary has created previously.  Other coordination mechanisms within the EOP
that have tangential responsibilities for coordinating bioterrrorism R&D include
OSTP’s Interagency Microbe Project Working Group and the Homeland Security
Council’s Policy Coordination Committees that deal with Research and Development
and with Medical and Public Health Preparedness.  Some aspects of bioterrorism
R&D are also being coordinated in NSTC via the”Biological and Chemical
Preparedness Working Group.”  Since S. 2452 (the Lieberman substitute under
consideration) gives more authority to the DNHS Secretary than to the DHHS
Secretary to set bioterrorism R&D priorities, the responsibilities of existing
coordination groups could become secondary to the role of the new Secretary if
S.2452 were enacted.  Under H.R. 5005, the DHHS Secretary is to collaborate with
the DHS Secretary in setting bioterrorism R&D priorities.  As a result, the
interagency coordinating devices might retain more authority if this bill were adopted.
Table 7.  Organization for Interagency Coordination of
Bioterrorism R&D
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)
Interagency Microbial Project Working Group
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)
Biological and Chemical Preparedness Working Group (DOD, HHS, CIA,            
         DOC, DOE, DOT, EPA, NSF, USDA, DOJ/FBI, VA, STATE, DOI, NASA,         
        Treasury, OMB, NSC, OHS, OSTP)
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
Interdepartmental Group on Bioterrrorism and Other Public Health Emergences
(HHS, USDA, CIA, DOD, DOE, Labor, VA, (P.L. 107-188)
Assistant Secretary of Public Health Emergency Preparedness (P.L. 107-188)
Department of Defense (DOD) 
Joint Service Chemical and Biological Defense Program, chaired by Assistant
Secretary for Chemical and Biological Defense, pursuant to P.L. 103-160
(Source: Prepared by CRS,)
Information Security R&D Coordination.  (See Appendix 3 for a
comprehensive discussion.)  Details about federal funding for counterterrorism-
related information security R&D are unclear.  It has been estimated that at least $243
million may be allocated to this field for FY2003.112  The coordination of information
security R&D has been formalized, pursuant to Executive Order 13231, October 16,
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2001,113 within the office of the Special Advisor to the President for Cyber Space
Security and the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board.  These units
have general responsibility for information security infrastructure and authority to
require agencies to allocate budgetary resources to priority R&D topics that serve the
board’s agenda.  These activities are coordinated with the National Security Council,
OHS, OSTP, DARPA and NSF.  See Table 8.  The need to collaborate closely with
Table 8.  Existing Mechanisms for Interagency Coordination of
Information Security R&D
Executive Office of the President (EOP)
        Special Advisor and Presidential  Assistant for Cyber Space Security, Richard       
                Clarke
          Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)
     The OSTP Director was named as a member of the interagency President’s       
             Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, which is to coordinate with the             
            OSTP Director to develop a federal R&D program for information systems        
            (E.O. 13231)
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)
     Interagency Working Group on Critical Infrastructure Protection for                  
                  Research and Development
              Interagency Working Group on Information Technology Research and              
                  Development, which has a Committee on Technology which also                  
                  supports the President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee          
                 (P.L. 102-194)
              Protection of Vulnerable Systems Work Group, which has an R&D Working    
                  Group jointly haded by the OSTP Director and the Special Advisor for         
                  Cyber Space Security
          Office of Homeland Security (OHS)
               President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board
                     Chaired by Special Advisor to the President for Cyber Space Security,       
                    who reports both to the Presidential Assistant for National Security and      
                   the Assistant for Homeland Security.  The OSTP Director is a member        
                   of the board, which has a R&D Subcommittee chaired by the OSTP             
                   director (E.O. 13231)
(Source: Prepared by CRS.)
industry in information security R&D and other aspects of infrastructure protection
may have motivated creation of a separate interagency coordination mechanism.
There are indications that this mechanism has identified R&D priorities and may have
compelled agencies to allocate budgetary resources for projects to meet the board’s
requirements.  The NSTC working  group on “Protection of Vulnerable Systems” may
engage in R&D priority-setting and coordination for information security R&D.
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There are no provisions in H.R. 5005 relating to information security R&D.  S.
2452 would transfer NIST’s Computer Security Division, which conducts R&D, to
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Division (sec. 133) and would give the Under
Secretary for Critical Infrastructure Protection some responsibilities for cyber
security.  The proposed DNHS is not given a major role in information security R&D
priority setting and cooperative activities.  As a result, the interagency coordination
apparatus established last fall by the President for information security R&D could
continue to play an important role if a homeland security department were created.
R&D in a Homeland Security Department: Policy Issues
The span of responsibility for counterterrorism R&D is more limited in the DHS
created by H.R. 5005 than in the DNHS created in the substitute version of S. 2452.
The homeland security department proposed in the House-passed bill could have
responsibility for about $500 to $600 million worth of counterterrorism R&D in total.
The CBO estimated that annual funding for newly authorized R&D in H.R. 5005
would tally about $300 million.  This is in addition to the funds for R&D which are
already authorized for programs to be transferred to DHS, estimated between  $200
million to $300 million.  Newly authorized R&D that would be handled by the
department created in the S. 2452 would total at least $350 million, with funding for
already authorized programs totaling an additional $200 to $300 million, for a total
approaching $650 million. Each bill would create an agency with R&D
responsibilities transferred from DOE, DOD, the Coast Guard, the Agriculture
Department, and the Transportation Security Administration.  DNHS would have
more responsibly for R&D than DHS since it would also manage the Computer
Security Division proposed to be transferred from NIST in the Commerce
Department, a $200 million R&D fund to be managed by the proposed SARPA, and
other R&D related responsibilities that are not in DHS.  Also, it would have more
responsibility than the DHS proposed in H.R. 5005 for setting priorities and funding
bioterrorism R&D in DHHS.  While the agency created under each bill would have
transferred to it some DOD bioterrorism R&D responsibilities, most military-oriented
bioterrrorism responsibilities would remain outside of either department, including
the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease in Fort Detrick MD,
the nation’s premier biodefense lab.  The proposed DNHS would have broader
authority than the proposed DHS to work with other agencies to coordinate
counterterrorism R&D programs and strategies.  
There is continuing concern about the actual content of a proposed homeland
security department’s span of R&D responsibilities in relation to other federal
counterterrorism R&D programs that remain outside of the department.  If a
homeland security department were responsible for about $500 million worth of
R&D, that would constitute about 17% of the FY2003 $3 billion counterterrorism
R&D budget.  This may mean that a large portion of the counterterrorism R&D
budget remaining outside of a new department either is not related to homeland
security, or that much homeland security related R&D would not be managed by the
homeland security department.  In order to resolve these issues, in a July 2002 report,
PCAST recommended that OSTP in conjunction with OMB, OHS and DHS should
“identify each federal R&D program that has relevance to homeland security.”  Then
the lists could be consolidated and Congress and DHS should be made aware of the
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lists to help them determine DHS’s responsibility for homeland security R&D
programs.114  
Concluding Observations: Issues for Congress
This report has summarized current programs and mechanisms for
counterterrorism R&D priority-setting and coordination, and has described alternative
proposals to create a new homeland security department with R&D responsibilities.
Debates about these issues are continuing in Congress.  Topics that might warrant
congressional attention are identified next. 
Arguments in Favor of R&D in a New Department  
Those favoring creation of a new homeland security department with
responsibilities for managing core counterterrorism R&D say such a department
could, 
! Give considerable visibility to counterterrorism R&D budgets;115
! Bring some scientists who do counterterrorism R&D together in one
department and increase their influence in national security debates;116 
! Enhance the contributions of DOE  nuclear weapons laboratories,  which might
offer substantial assets for homeland security, and once good technologies
were developed, help to accelerate their deployment more quickly and possibly
more economically than DOE or HHS would have been able to do;117
! Project clear responsibility and authority for some counterterrorism R&D; 
!  Link priority setting clearly to intelligence information and homeland security
threats; and
! Augment current organizational arrangements for counterterrorism R&D by
establishing  a way to manage and oversee the analysis, evaluation, and testing
bodies proposed to be created in order to hasten development and deployment
of new counterterrorism technologies. 
Concerns About R&D in a New Department
Others caution that important questions need to be answered in designing a new
department with R&D responsibilities.  These include, 
! Is the Administration’s homeland security R&D policy sufficiently well-
formulated to determine R&D priorities for a homeland security department
and to define the rationale and relationships between the R&D that will be
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consolidated (about 17% of the current federal counterterrorism R&D budget)
and the rest of the counterterrorism R&D that will remain outside of DHS?118
! Would the department give adequate attention to prevention and R&D
priorities that deal with controlling dangerous materials, sensors, surveillance
and data management?119 
! Would attention be given to maintaining dual-use or dual-purpose R&D
programs that have both civilian and security applications120 so that there will
be no compromise to the natural synergies and communications between
researchers, which is important to scientific advancement and to avoid
duplication of effort? 121
! If a proposed homeland security department were to be given more
responsibility for bioterrorism research, what steps should the department take
to ensure adequate support for the fundamental research and science needed?122
! How should a new department interface with the existing mechanisms for
coordination of counterterrorism R&D in the agencies, the OHS, OSTP,
NSTC, statutorily mandated bodies, and other existing interagency
mechanisms?  What would be the specific lines of communication  and
responsibility between the directors of OSTP and OHS on the one hand, and
the Under Secretary for Science and Technology in a new department on the
other? 
! Where, in a DHS, in a DNHS, or in existing EOP agencies, should attention
be given to research policy issues identified as critical to homeland security
CRS-45
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R&D, including proposals for enhancing industrial R&D; collecting better
information about the funding of federal counterterrorism R&D;  balancing the
conduct of science with security sensitive research and information needs;123
conducting classified research on university campuses; and developing
programs to enlarge the number of U.S. students studying science and
technology?
! Would creation of a new department necessitate changes to existing multiple
congressional committee authorization and appropriations jurisdiction for
R&D in order to enhance congressional oversight and appropriations processes
for homeland security R&D?124
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Appendix 1.  NSTC’s Antiterrorism Task Force
Working Groups
(This information was provided by OSTP.)
Radiological, Nuclear and Conventional (RNC) Working Group.  The group is tasked: to
understand the radiological, nuclear, and conventional threat and associated U.S.
vulnerabilities; to develop a prioritized set of goals for detecting and responding to that
threat;  to  understand the technical alternatives for detection and response; and to develop
a 5 year R&D program aimed at satisfying the performance goals.  The near term work
program includes: surveying the threats; reviewing current agency requirements for
prevention, detection, response, treatment, decontamination, modeling and simulation, and
other required activities; assessing likely progress toward meeting those requirements under
current R&D programs; and developing guidance for the FY04 budget.   Membership – CIA,
DOT, DOC, EPA, DOD, NSF, DOE, NSC, DOJ, NRC, DOS, OMB.
Biological and Chemical Preparedness Working Group.  The Biological and Chemical
Preparedness (BCP) Working Group will bring together Federal agencies that fund and
oversee BCP research and development (R&D) efforts or that use the results of such
activities.  BCP for combating terrorist threats to U.S. citizens and residents (human health),
and to animal and plant species of economic or cultural importance to the United States will
be the overarching goal of the Working Group’s efforts.  Issues to be addressed by the BCP
Working Group include identifying current BCP R&D activities that can inform the Federal
antiterrorism agenda (e.g., assessment of existing identification and detection technologies,
databases and bioinformatics programs); identification of technological preparations and
response options (e.g., vaccines, treatments, neutralization methodologies, automated
response planning systems); determining how R&D efforts can be better linked to current
“operational” antiterrorism activities; examining the scope of and linkages between current
public and private R&D agendas; assessing the research infrastructure (e.g., capacity, core
competency, sources of current expertise); and identifying priorities for strengthening
antiterrorism programs.  The Working Group will work actively with appropriate groups
chartered by the OHS and NSC, and with the National Academies of Science and
professional organizations to coordinate efforts and to enlist the participation of appropriate
National experts. Membership – DOD, HHS, CIA, DOC, DOE, DOT, EPA, NSF, USDA,
DOJ/FBI, VA, STATE, DOI, NASA, Treasury, OMB, NSC, OHS, OSTP.
Rapid Response Working Group.  The Rapid Response Team consists of greater than 25
Federal agencies with expertise and technologies related to homeland security.  From the
agency points of contact list, small working groups are established on an ad hoc basis to
fulfill the mission of the response team working group.  The mission is to form expert
subgroups in response to timely, emergent issues which require the scientific and technical
expertise of the Federal government’s agencies.  The agency points of contact have the
authority to request their agency personnel for aid in rapidly responding to questions,
proposals or directives from the Director of OSTP and other White House Offices.  The
subgroups, through the OSTP representative, will report their findings/ recommendations to
the Director of OSTP for the appropriate action.  For example, the OSTP Irradiation
Technical Team elicited help from the AFRRI/DOD, NIST, USDA, FDA, and DOE to
address through experimental design and make recommendations to the USPS on the
sterilization of the mail contaminated with Bacillus anthracis.  The team continues to
function in scientific evaluation of the mail irradiation issue and in ongoing experiments
related to the use of X-rays in decontaminating larger packages.  Likewise, the OSTP
Ethylene Oxide (EtO) Technical Team was assembled with scientific experts from DOJ,
EPA, FDA, CDC, CIA, AFRRI/DOD, and OSHA in order to determine the technical
parameters and standards of EtO sterilization for decontaminating mail packages and items
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of the biopathogen.  Membership  –  AFRRI, CDC, CIA, DARPA, DOD, DOEd, DOE, DOI,
DOJ, DOT, EPA, FBI, FDA, FEMA, HHS, NASA, NOAA, NIC, NIOSH, NIST, NRC, NSF,
OHS, OMB, OSHA, State, USDA, USPS, USSS, VA.  
Social, Behavioral and Education Sciences (SBE) Working Group.125  The Social, Behavioral
and Education Sciences (SBE) Working group will bring together agencies who oversee SBE
R&D efforts that are relevant to antiterrorism activities, as well as agencies with
programmatic activities related to the agenda of the working group.  Issues to be addressed
by the SBE working group include identifying current SBE R&D activities that can inform
the federal antiterrorism agenda (e.g., terror management, decision-making analysis, crisis
intervention care, etc.), determining how such efforts can be better linked to current
antiterrorism planning and response activities, and drafting a coordinated and integrated
interagency SBE antiterrorism R&D agenda and budget.  The Working Group will actively
work with the National Academies of Science and SBE professional organizations to
coordinate efforts and to enlist the participation of academic researchers and policy analysts.
The group will produce a prioritized portfolio review and recommendations for areas
requiring additional R&D funding.  Membership – OSTP, NSF, NIH, DOD, DHHS, VA, NIJ,
CDC, OHSA, and ED, with new members being added from the CIA, EPA, NIOSH, DARPA
and FBI.
Appendix 2. Priorities, Funding, and Coordination Of
Bioterrorism R&D
FY2003 Bioterrorism R&D Funding and Priorities
The President’s report, Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation, 2002,
presented data on cross-agency R&D funding for defending against bioterrorism R&D
for FY2003 at $2.435 billion, an almost 5-fold increase over FY2002.126  See
Appendix Table 1.
In a report released in July 2002, the Defense Science Board (DSB) task force
report recommended that DOD should “quadruple its annual investment in biowarfare
defense from $250 million to $1 billion ....”127  The National Academies’ report,
Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering
Terrorism, recommended priorities for bioterrorism R&D,128 including: new tools for
the surveillance, detection and diagnosis of bioterrorist threat agents, “increased
knowledge of the pathogenesis of and immune responses to biological infectious
agents,” the development of new drugs, vaccines and devices to address bioterrorist
threats, decontamination and bioterrorism forensics. Two recommendations were
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categorized as “Urgent Research Opportunities.” They were to “develop effective
treatments and preventatives for known pathogens for which current responses are
unavailable and for potential emerging pathogens,” and to “develop new methods and
standards for filtering air against both chemicals and pathogens as well as better
methods and standards for decontamination.”129
Appendix Table 1.  R&D Funding for Defense Against Biological
Terrorism
(Dollars in millions)






Basic and applied biodefense research (NIH) $93 $ 85 $1,080
Biodefense research infrastructure (NIH) 0 70 336
Anthrax vaccine development (NIH and CDC) 18 0 268
Expedited drug approval/research (FDA) 7  41 49
Research facility security upgrades (HHS) 0 84 100
Bio weapons defense/counter-measures (DOD) 120
Agent identification, detection and area monitoring
(DOD) 
300
Other R&D (DOD) 182 1 182
Total $300 $281 $2,435
Source: Securing the Homeland and Strengthening the Budget. February, 2002
(www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/0 homeland_security_book.pdf).
FY2003 DOD Bioterrorism R&D Priorities.  Among the Administration’s
FY2003 budget initiatives for DOD was a Biological Counterterrorism Research
Program which would establish a biological terrorism threat assessment research
Center for Biological Counterterrorism at the U.S. Army Medical Research and
Materiel Command at Fort Detrick, Maryland.  The concepts and scope of research
will be developed by “a panel of senior scientists from DOD, federal laboratories,
[and the] academic, industry and intelligence communities ....”130 The DOD program
would award funds to achieve the following program objectives: 
BIOLOGICAL COUNTERTERRORISM RESEARCH PROGRAM
Conduct a technology survey and identify gaps.
Award extramural research with emphasis on identification of virulence factors,
pathogenic mechanisms and structural biology.
Establish research programs in aerobiological research, forensic genomics and
certified forensic biological threat agent capability.
Initiate planning and concept development for necessary infrastructure.
Develop “Applied Microbial Threat Assessment Research” to assist in the
development of the counterterrorism research program and to establish a
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management element for the program; develop program policy, strategic plan, short
through far term investment strategies.
Develop environmental and access control point monitoring.
Develop enhanced medical surveillance technologies.
Demonstrate an enhanced signatures database and conduct baseline studies.
Develop improved biological defense data mining, fusion, and analysis
architectures. 
Conduct Baseline Self Assessment (BSA), Mission Area Assessments (MAAs),
and Requirements Analysis and Process Development.131
DOD has also established specific R&D initiatives for monitoring in an urban
environment, and for increasing chemical and biological defense capabilities at DOD
installations.132  DOD also supports a Joint Medical Chemical and Biological Defense
Research Program.  In addition there is a Biological Warfare Defense Program in
DARPA.133  This program was described in hearings held in April 2002 before the
Senate Committee on Armed Services.  It focuses on “sensors to detect biological
agents, vaccines to prevent infection, therapies to treat people who have been
exposed, and decontamination technologies ....”134  New initiatives include an
unconventional pathogen countermeasures program, biological sensor programs, the
“Continuous Assisted Performance Program,” to prevent fatigue, and a “Brain
Machine Interface Program.135
FY2003 DHHS Bioterrorism R&D Priorities.  The National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases’ (NIAID) FY2003 budget request of  $1.7 billion for
bioterrorism-related R&D and infrastructure was about a fivefold increase over
FY2002.  This included about $441 million for basic research, about $592 million for
therapeutics, drugs, and vaccines, about $195 million for clinical research and pilot
studies for diagnostics involving new vaccines and drugs and about $521 million for
facilities and training, including construction and renovation of buildings and
facilities, “including establishing a series of extramural and intramural Centers of
Excellence for bioterrorism and Emerging Infections” with higher biosafety levels for
research laboratories.136  NIAID’s plans for research to protect against bioterrorism
agents such as smallpox, anthrax, tularemia, and plague, viral hemorrhagic fevers, and
botulism, were identified in its report, NIAID Counter-Bioterrorism Research Agenda
for CDC Category A Agents and in its broad strategic for research on potential
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bioterrorism pathogens, Strategic Plan for Counter-Bioterrorism Research of the
NIAID.137 
Bioterrorism R&D Coordination Mechanisms in DOD and
DHHS  
DOD’s coordination mechanisms were created before the September 11th attacks.
In 1993, Congress passed P.L. 103-160, of which Section 1703 created a Joint Service
Chemical and Biological Defense Program (JSCBDP), with responsibility to  develop
and oversee the defense chemical and biological R&D program.  It is chaired by a
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense.
The JSCBDP establishes priorities, monitors work, and sees that results are integrated
into defense programs.  It coordinates via informal consultations with other agencies
that support or conduct bioterrorism R&D, such as NIH and DOE, to ensure
eliminating duplication.  It also established and chairs a federal interagency advisory
group to deal with the issue of establishing a production facility for “biological
defense vaccines.”  Other participants are from OSTP, the Office of an Homeland
Security, the National Security Council, OMB, Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), DHHS agencies.138  The JSCBDP is required to report to Congress
annually.139 
In June 2001, Dr. Scott Lillibridge, a leading national bioterrorism expert, was
named the DHHS Secretary’s Special Assistant for National Security and
Bioterrorism.140  On November 1, 2001, to help coordinate the internal response to
bioterrorism and also to coordinate with other departments, agencies and offices and
state and local entities, DHHS Secretary Tommy Thompson created an Office of
Public Health Emergency Preparedness, headed by an assistant Secretary, Donald A.
Henderson, former director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense
Studies and one of the nation’s leading bioterrorism experts.141  On May 3, 2002,
Jerome Hauer, who has extensive experience in developing bioterrorism response
plans and preparedness, was appointed to replace Dr. Henderson, who resigned but
continues “to serve as Principal Science Advisor to Secretary Thompson on issues of
public health preparedness and chairman of the Council on Public Health
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(continued...)
Preparedness.”142  The position of Assistant Secretary of Public Health Emergency
Preparedness was statutorily created in the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Response Act of 2002 (Section 102 of P.L. 107-188).  It has not been filled, as of
September 11, 2002. 
Interagency Coordination for Bioterrorism R&D  
Informal mechanisms for multi-agency collaboration in bioterrorism R&D
involve CDC, FDA, NIH, especially the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases, and DOD, especially the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases (USAMRIID), the Office of Naval Research, and DARPA.143  Formal
interagency coordination takes several forms in addition to the mechanisms already
described.  Priority-setting and collaboration in genetic sequencing of microbes with
possible terrorist implications is being coordinated through OSTP’s Interagency
Microbe Project Working Group.144  As noted above, the Homeland Security Council
has Policy Coordination Committees to ensure interagency coordination of specific
aspects of homeland security.  One committee deals with Research and Development
and another focuses on Medical and Public Health Preparedness.  The secretaries of
major departments, including DHHS and DOD, are members of the council and
groups which comprise the Homeland Security Agency.  There is also a NSTC
“Biological and Chemical Preparedness Working Group.”  In addition, Section 108
of P.L. 107-188 created an “Interdepartmental Working Group on Bioterrorism and
Other Public Health Emergencies,” chaired by the DHHS Secretary, and composed
of the Secretaries of Agriculture, DOD, Energy, Labor, Veterans Affairs, the Attorney
General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and
other federal officials as appropriate, to recommend policies relating to the
prevention, preparedness, and response to bioterrorism and other public health
emergencies.  Among its responsibilities is “research on pathogens likely to be used
in a biological threat or attack on the civilian population.”
 Congressional Activities and Options 
Numerous congressional hearings addressing bioterrorism research issues, have
been held.145  Major legislative proposals that address bioterrorism R&D have dealt
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with such issues as enhancing R&D priority-setting and coordination; improving the
organization of research, expanding funding for specific kinds of R&D, including
R&D at the Department of Veterans’ Affairs; and improving cooperation with
pharmaceutical firms.
Pending Legislation on Bioterrorism R&D.  The provisions relating to
DHHS R&D, including bioterrorism prevention activities in H.R. 5005 and S. 2452
were discussed above.  Other legislation includes: 
S. 2487, “Global Pathogen Surveillance Act.”   Agreed to in the Senate on August 1, 2002,
it would improve the capacity of laboratories in developing countries and their capability to
do epidemiological surveillance, by establishing  cooperative relationships between United
States public health laboratories and foreign counterparts, and by expanding the training and
outreach activities of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Department of
Defense to enhance the public health capabilities of developing countries. The bill was
reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations on May 23, 2002, (Sen. Rept. 107-210).
H.R. 3253, “National Medical Emergency Preparedness Act.”  Amended and passed in
the House on May 20, 2002, (House Report 107-471),  and in the Senate on August 1, 2002;
conference action completed September 17, 2002.  It would establish a four new National
Medical Preparedness Centers for R&D on radiological, chemical, and biological threats.
R&D and training would be conducted by the Department of Veterans Affairs in cooperation
with such other agencies as, NIH, CDC, DOD and the Office of Homeland Security.  In
addition, the centers would provide laboratory assistance to facilities at state and local levels,
during emergencies. $20 million would be authorized for each fiscal year to 2006. 
S. 1764, “Robert Stevens, Thomas Morris Jr., Joseph Curseen, Kathy Nguyen, Ottilie
Lundgren, and Lisa J. Raines Biological and Chemical Weapons Research Act”
Introduced on December 4, 2001, it would provide tax and patent incentives to increase
research by commercial entities to develop vaccines, microbicides, diagnostic technologies,
and other drugs to prevent and treat illnesses associated with a biological or chemical
weapons.  It would also authorize the NIH Director to fund the construction of additional
biosafety laboratories and “promote joint ventures between the NIH, its grantees, and
for-profit biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and medical device industries for the development
of countermeasures and research tools.”  $200 million would be authorized for each of the
next five years for the program.  No further action has occurred. 
S. 2115, “Center for Bioterrorism Preparedness In the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention Research Act” Introduced on April 11, 2002, it would create a Center for
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response within the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention.  It would require registration for the possession, use and transfer of biological,
chemical and radiological agents and toxins that could threaten public health and safety and
development of a list of such agents.  No further action has occurred. 
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Concluding Observations on Coordination of Bioterrorism
R&D
It has been recommended that interagency bioterrorism R&D mechanisms be
strengthened to inventory R&D funding and programs; set priorities; eliminate
duplication; and develop policy for effective collaboration with industry, professional
groups, academia and federal laboratories.  Steps in this direction are being taken.
Existing governmental organization for coordinating bioterrorism R&D is depicted
in Table 7.  During 2002, Congress mandated a statutorily authorized Assistant
Secretary of Public Health Emergency Preparedness and an Interdepartmental  Group
on Bioterrrorism and Other Public Health Emergences (P.L. 107-188).  That law also
set certain priorities for bioterrorism R&D.  Legislation is moving through Congress
which would give a department of homeland security authority to collaborate with
DHHS in setting bioterrorism R&D priorities (H.R. 5005), or to set priorities for
DHHS, DOE and other bioterrorism R&D and fund selected DHHS programs with
funds transferred from DNHS (S. 2452).  These proposals would clearly link DHHS
bioterrorism R&D to homeland security intelligence and policy.  Other pending
legislation would create or augment bioterrorism R&D programs or facilities. 
Some critics object to proposals to give a department of homeland security
responsibility to set bioterrorism R&D priorities or to challenge the priority decisions
made by the DHHS Secretary.  They say that the DHHS Secretary is in a better
position than the DHS Secretary to set biological sciences R&D priorities, and that
progress in countering bioterrorism cannot occur if infectious diseases research is
separated from research on toxic agents that could be used by terrorists, such as
smallpox.146  Some say that the DHHS Secretary already is linked to surveillance,
research, and treatment functions and this authority is adequate:  
Currently, [DHHS Secretary] Thompson has a one-stop shop at HHS.  He has
authority over the Public Health Service, which includes the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (the experts on infectious disease): the Food and Drug
Administration (the regulator of vaccines, drugs, and food safety; and the
National Institutes of Health (the premier medical research entity.)  Moreover
HHS is home to the Office of Emergency Preparedness, which seeks to ensure
that hospitals and other bioterrorism responders are ready to meet the challenge
of an attack.  In addition, Thompson has created the Office of Public Health
Preparedness to coordinate the department’s many efforts on bioterrorism.147
An issue that may be  considered in assessing whether a homeland department
should have more control over bioterrorism R and D is balancing (1) the importance
of ensuring a link between homeland security needs as defined by a proposed DHS
Secretary using intelligence information and other estimates of vulnerability with (2)
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the importance of having scientists who work on bioterrorism R&D define priorities
based on scientific and technical developments.  There is also the need to coordinate
all of DOD’s extensive bioterrorism R&D activities with those of the new department
and DHHS.
Appendix 3. Information Security R&D
Funding for Information Security R&D
According to the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection,
about $250 million was being invested in FY1997 (the latest year for which R&D data
are available) on critical infrastructure protection R&D, with 60%, or $150 million,
for information security.  The commission recommended an increase ranging from
$250 million to $500 million in FY1999, “with incremental increases ... over a five-
year  period to $1 billion in FY04.”148  It is generally acknowledged that DOD
provides the lion’s share of information security R&D funding because of its mission
needs.  Precise funding amounts are unknown.  However, one of DOD’s constituent
agencies, the National Security Agency (NSA), reported an information security
RDT&E budget of $308 million for FY2000 and requested $415 million for
FY2001.149
For FY2003, the president’s homeland security budget identified as one of four
initiatives “Using 21st Century Technology to Defend the Homeland.”  Total  funding
requested for IT/information sharing under this category was $722 million.  It appears
that at least $243 million could be allocated to R&D related to information security.
The largest clearly identified R&D funding line was for the NSF program for
Research and Physical and Information Technology, at $198 million in FY2002, and
requested at $197 million for FY2003.  Elements of information security research
were also included in the program initiative, “Cyberspace Security: Protecting Our
Information Infrastructure,”but the amount for R&D was not separately identified.
See Appendix Table 2.  These data do not include about $400 million for R&D in
the National Security Agency and at the Defense Information Agency, which would
appear to support R&D related to information security.150
Options for Priority-setting
In activities that have occurred since January 2002, a June 2002 National
Academies’ report recommended cybersecurity R&D priorities to protect information
systems and develop applications to reduce the nation’s vulnerability to terrorist
attack.151  One of the most urgent research needs was to “advance the practical  utility
of data fusion and data mining for intelligence analysis, and enhance information
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security against cyberattacks.”152  It also recommended “A strategic long-term
research and development agenda should be established to address three primary
Counterterrorism-related areas in IT: information and network security, the IT needs
of emergency responders, and information fusion.”153
Options for Organization
It is difficult to coordinate R&D for information security R&D.  While many
federal agencies support relevant R&D, systems applications largely are a private
sector responsibility.  Suggestions for an organizational format to determine R&D
priorities vary from placing the responsibility in a new Office of Homeland Security
to augmenting an existing agency.  Recommendations made since January 2002 are
summarized next. 
Appendix Table 2.  Counterterrorism Programs Which Include









National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center (Dept. of Energy) 
$0 $0 $20
NSF: CIP Research and Physical and IT Security 198 0 197
Cybercorps R&D Training (NSF) 11 0 11
Computer Security Division, NIST 11 0 15
(Source: Securing the Homeland Strengthening the Nation, 2002.)
The CSIS focused on “threats emanating from the convergence of multiple
technologies and sciences (e.g., information technology, nanotechnology, biotech,
robotics, and microelectromechanical.)”  It said government has failed to provide
among other things, “... the necessary investments in research and defensive and
offensive tools to fulfill national security objectives.”  As a result, CSIS concluded:
“A clear delegation of authority or chain of command both in the prevention and
remediation of cyber attacks remains lacking.  There also is no clear-cut authority for
dealing with the issue of national information infrastructure protection.”154  According
to William A. Wulf, president of the National Academy of Engineering, and Anita K.
Jones, along with Wulf a professor of engineering at the University of Virginia, “...
a particular government agency must take of the mission of revitalizing research in
cybersecurity with the following objectives: 
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the development of wholly new methods of ensuring information system security,
the development of a larger research community in cybersecurity, and the
education of computer system and computer science majors in cybersecurity at
the undergraduate level, which would eventually improve the state of the practice
in industry.155
The third “Gilmore Report,” concluded that “Enhanced R&D is critical to cyber
security.  Technology is changing so rapidly that additional near-and long-term
research is required.  Many Federal agencies are engaged in research development,
test, and evaluation (RDT&E) in the cyber realm.  However, no single comprehensive
research agenda now exists that establishes priorities, prevents unnecessary
duplication, and identifies gaps in current research.”  It recommended “... that the
Office of Homeland Security develop and implement a comprehensive plan for
RDT&E to enhance cyber security.  We envision a government-funded consortium
of not-for-profit entities with expertise in the field.  That entity can serve as the
fulcrum for leveraging RDT&E resources in a manner consistent with national
priorities for cyber security.”156
The National Academies observed that “no agency or department has the primary
mission to foster progress” in information security.157  It called for better coordination
of R&D:
DARPA and NSF created much of the science base for the Internet and for
computer science in general, and other agencies—DOE, DOD, FBI, and NASA
in particular—have made important contributions to computer-network
technology.  But the security of commercial computers is left largely to the
private sector, and the present weakness in this area is a consequence of minimal
market demand for it in the past.  Coordination of agency efforts in this area is
important, as is building a federal infrastructure to tap the intellectual and fiscal
resources of private industry.158 
Policy Actions Since September 11, 2001.  After the terrorist attacks, the
Administration sought to develop a capability to coordinate cyber security activities
with the nation’s counterterrorism effort and to better link information security R&D
to these efforts.  The mechanism developed has the potential to work effectively
because it is closely linked to the antiterrorism effort and to the OSTP, and has
specific authority to work with agencies to develop priority R&D programs and
budgets.
In Executive Order 13231, October 16, 2001,159 President Bush created “The
President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board,” charged with preventing
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(continued...)
disruptions of critical infrastructure and information networks in water,
telecommunication, financial, transportation, health care, emergency services and
manufacturing.  Although it is directed to work closely with industry and State and
local governments, it is composed wholly of executive agency officials, including the
OSTP Director and 24 other agency heads and officials.  It is chaired by the Special
Advisor to the President for Cyber Space Security, who reports both to the Assistant
for National Security and the Assistant for Homeland Security.  On October 9, 2001,
President Bush named Richard Clarke, the Clinton Administration Critical
Infrastructure coordinator, to serve as his special advisor on Cyber Space Security and
director of the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board.160  He was not
specifically mentioned on the organizational chart as a member of the senior-level
OHS Principals Committee, but he was listed among those who will attend meetings
of the sub-Cabinet Deputies Committee if cyber security is discussed.161  
The Board, which was given responsibility “to recommend policies and
coordinate programs,” was charged to 
Coordinate with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP) on a program of Federal Government research and development for
protection of information systems for critical infrastructure, including emergency
preparedness communications, and the physical assets that support such systems,
and ensure coordination of government activities in this field with corporations,
universities, federally funded research centers, and national laboratories.
The executive order established 10 standing committees, including one on
Research and Development, chaired by a designee of the Director of OSTP.  In
addition to proposing plans for “subjects within its purview,” and making
recommendations to OMB on agency budgets “that fall within the Board’s purview,
after review of relevant program requirements and resources,” the Board was given
specific authority to “annually request the National Science Foundation, Department
of Energy, Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency,
Department of Commerce, Departments of Defense, and the Intelligence Community
,,,  to include in their budget requests to OMB funding for demonstration projects and
research to support the Board’s activities.” 
Since last fall, Clarke appears to have been actively guiding information security
R&D activities, and has been quoted several times as having remarked that the private
sector is not supporting sufficient amounts of cybersecurity R&D or paying enough
attention to correcting vulnerabilities in information systems.162  The Administration
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apparently is seeking to expand partnerships with the private sector and encourage
information sharing among industrial firms to help prevent attacks on computer
systems.  Reportedly, it “is formulating a tool called the Cyber Warning and
Information Network to warn public and private sector businesses of impending cyber
attacks, such as computer viruses that can hijack critical systems.”163  The
Administration also seeks to develop an large Cybercorps  program, which allocates
scholarships totaling about $30,000 annually to students who choose to study
information technology security issues164 and urged universities to cooperate in
developing a  framework for  cybersecurity R&D.165  The NSTC working group on
“Protection of Vulnerable Systems” may engage in R&D priority-setting and
coordination for information security R&D.
Congressional Options 
There are no provisions in H.R. 5005 relating to information security R&D.  S.
2452 would transfer the NIST computer security division, which conducts R&D, to
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Division (sec. 133) and would give the Under
Secretary for Critical Infrastructure Protection some responsibilities for cyber
security.  The extent of the proposed Under Secretary’s responsibility for information
security R&D priority setting and leadership of cooperative activities was not
detailed.  
The following are other major active bills that relate to counterterrorism R&D.
S. 1900, “Cyberterrorism Preparedness Act.” Introduced January 28, 2002, it authorizes
the National Institute of Standards and Technology to award $350 million over the next five
years for development of cybersecurity best practices, long-term cybersecurity R&D, and
related activities.  No further action has occurred.
S. 1901, “Cybersecurity Research and Education Act.” Introduced January 28, 2002, it
would fund new fellowships at the NSF and the National Security Agency, and would offer
incentives for students and teachers to focus on cybersecurity.  The bill also directs the
Comptroller General to study, collect data, and report on the cybersecurity workforce and
on academic cybersecurity research facilities.  It authorizes $35 million to carry out the
provisions of the bill until 2005.  No further action has occurred.
H.R. 3394, “Cyber Security Research and Development Act”/S. 2182.  Passed in the
House on February 7, 2002, it authorizes $875 million over the next five years for research
and other activities against cyber-terrorism.  $568 million would go to NSF and the
remainder to NIST for cybersecurity R&D.  New programs would include cybersecurity
research centers, undergraduate program grants, competitive fellowship grants, and joint
university/industry programs to attract more researchers to the field of computer and
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network.  A Senate companion bill, S. 2182, introduced on April 17, 2002 was ordered to be
reported favorably, amended, on May 17, 2002. 166
H.R. 3844, “Federal Information Security Management Act.”  Introduced on March 5,
2002, it would require the Director of NIST to establish an office to conduct research to
determine the nature and extent of information security vulnerabilities and techniques for
providing cost-effective information security.  Hearings were held on May 2, 2002.
H.R. 1259, “Computer Security Enhancement Act of 2001.” Passed in the House on
November 27, 2001, it would among other things provide fellowships to students to study
cyber security, require a study by the National Academies on electronic authentication
technologies, and require the Secretary of Commerce to promote increased use of security
technologies for the nation’s information infrastructure.
Concluding Observations
As noted, coordination of information security R&D has been formalized within
the office of the Special Advisor to the President for Cyber Space Security and the
President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, which was also given some
authority to require agencies to allocate budget resources to priority R&D topics that
serve the board’s agenda.  See Table 8.  The need to collaborate closely with industry
in  information security R&D and other aspects of infrastructure protection may have
motivated creation of a separate interagency coordination mechanism for information
security R&D  It remains to be determined how effectively this mechanism will be
able to identify federal R&D priorities and compel agencies to allocate budgetary
resources for projects to meet the board’s requirements.
Appendix 4. National Academies’ Activities
 The National Academies created a 22-member Committee on the Science and
Technology Agenda for Countering Terrorism.  Funding for this work came from
foundations and the Academies’ own endowment, (reportedly it used $2 million of
its endowment to start activities).167  The resulting report, released in June 2002,
identified seven “Urgent Research Opportunities,”  (see Appendix Table 3A) and
organizational issues (see Appendix Table 3B), and recommended specific actions
to enhance federal agency capabilities to fulfill counter terrorism S&T missions.  For
instance, it recommended that the Department of Agriculture “needs the capacity to
perform and fund research on plant and animal diseases and to develop and deploy
surveillance systems.  An agricultural equivalent of the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention might be an appropriate approach.” (See Chapters 3 and 4.)
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Appendix Table 3A. “Urgent Research Opportunities” Identified
in National Academies’ Report
1. Develop effective treatments and preventatives for known pathogens for which current
responses are unavailable and for potential emerging pathogens.
2. Develop, test, and implement an intelligent, adaptive electric-power grid.
3. Advance the practical utility of data fusion and data mining for intelligence analysis, and
enhance information security against cyberattacks.
4. Develop new and better technologies (e.g., protective gear, sensors, communications) for
emergency responders.
5. Advance engineering design technologies and fire-rating standards for blast- and fire-resistant
buildings.
6. Develop sensor and surveillance systems (for a wide range of targets) that create useful
information for emergency officials and decision makers.
7. Develop new methods and standards for filtering air against both chemicals and pathogens as
well as better methods and standards for decontamination.168
Appendix Table 3B.  R&D and Organizational Issues in National
Academies’ Report
 Nuclear and Radiological Threats
 Human and Agricultural Health Systems




Cities and Fixed Infrastructure
The Response of People to Terrorism
Complex and Interdependent Systems (systems engineering, threat modeling and infrastructure
modeling)
The Significance of Crosscutting Challenges and Technologies (systems analyses and modeling;
integrated data management; sensors and sensor networks; autonomous mobile robotic
technologies; supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems; biometrics; and
human and organizational factors)
Equipping the Federal Government to Counter Terrorism (coordination, analysis, OSTP, federal
agencies)
Essential Partners in a National Strategy (cooperation with states, cities, universities)169
The Academies made available on their website the text of 25 publications about
science, policy and security,170 briefed TSWG panels, initiated work on bioterrorism,
largely within the IOM, and studied issues affecting universities arising out of
terrorism events.171  The National Academy of Engineering also initiated a “ study of
‘homeland defense’ against terrorism,”  now in process.172 Separate studies, some on
contract for federal agencies, were initiated through the National Research Council
and the IOM on such issues as the psychology and sociology of terrorists
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organizations agricultural bioterrorism, transportation security, water supply
protection, chemistry and national security.173  
Appendix 5. Acronyms
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CBW Chemical and Biological Warfare
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DHS Department of Homeland Security (Proposed)
DHHS Department of Health and Human Services
DNHS Department of National Homeland Security (Proposed)
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DSB Defense Science Board
E.O. Executive Order
EOP Executive Office of the President
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
GAO General Accounting Office
HHS Health and Human Service [Department]
HSC Homeland Security Council
IBM International Business Machines Corp.
IOM Institute of Medicine
NAE National Academy of Engineering
NAS National Academy of Sciences
NIH National Institute of Health
NRC National Research Council
NSC National Security Council
NSTC National Science and Technology Council
OHS Office of Homeland Security
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy
PCAST President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
PCC Policy Coordination Committee
PWMD Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Group
R&D Research and Development
RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
S&T Science and Technology
TSWG Technical Support Working Group
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
